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Abstract
Multinational corporations (MNCs) manage complex operations, often blending features of three
modes of FDI that are well understood in isolation but not in tandem, namely: horizontal, vertical and
export-platform FDI. We develop a three-country model with heterogeneous firms, in order to analyze
how financing constraints in the FDI host country affect the relative strength of these three motives for
FDI. In our model, financial development in the host country fosters entry by domestic firms, making
the local market more competitive for MNC products. This leads MNCs to orient their affiliate sales
away from the local market toward other markets instead. These predictions find strong confirmation
in detailed data on the activities of U.S. multinationals abroad. We find that MNC affiliates in hosts
with more mature financial markets: (i) channel a smaller share of their sales to the local market; (ii)
send a bigger share of their sales back to the U.S., as well as to third-country destinations; and that
(iii) these effects of host country financial development appear to be mediated through the entry of
establishments in the local economy.
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1 Introduction
Multinational corporations (MNCs) today manage complex global operations that serve multiple markets.
Understanding what factors shape the location of MNC production and the patterns of MNC sales is
important for a number of reasons. It sheds light on market conditions that affect the competitiveness
of domestic firms vis-a`-vis MNC affiliates, both at home and abroad. It speaks to a potential channel for
the transmission of shocks across borders. Finally, it raises policy implications for countries that seek to
attract FDI in order to generate capital inflows, jobs and technology spillovers.
The prior literature has identified three main motives for multinational activity that are well under-
stood in isolation but not in tandem, namely: horizontal, vertical and export-platform FDI. Horizontal
FDI occurs when MNCs set up full-fledged production facilities abroad for the purpose of selling to the
local market, instead of exporting directly from home.1 Vertical FDI arises when firms relocate some
production stages to take advantage of cross-country differences in factor prices, while their final cus-
tomers remain in the parent country.2 Export-platform FDI describes a hybrid activity, where a foreign
affiliate is set up as a production base for servicing third-country destinations.3 In practice, however,
MNC operations do not conform neatly to this categorization and instead display features of all three
FDI motives: The average U.S. affiliate abroad sells about 75% of its output in the host country, ships
just under 10% back to the U.S., and exports the remainder to other markets (see Table 1).4
This paper shows that the level of financial development in the FDI host country affects the tradeoffs
that MNCs make between these different modes of FDI. Using detailed data collected by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) on the activities of U.S. multinationals from 1989-2009, we establish three
empirical regularities in the spatial composition of MNC affiliate sales. First, affiliates in countries with
more mature financial markets channel a smaller share of their sales to the local market. Second, they
send a bigger share of their sales back to the U.S. Third, they also direct a greater share of their sales to
third-country destinations, with this effect on platform sales being stronger than that on return sales to
the U.S. Taken together, we view this as evidence that stronger financial institutions in the host nation
are associated with a reduced incentive to pursue horizontal FDI; these conditions instead favor vertical
and especially export-platform activity.5
1See Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), Markusen and Venables (2000), and Helpman et al. (2004) for theory and
evidence on the proximity-concentration tradeoff. This posits that horizontal FDI should be more attractive than direct
exporting when transport costs are high, but plant economies of scale are low relative to firm economies of scale.
2See Helpman (1984), Hummels et al. (2001), Hanson et al. (2001, 2005), and Yeaple (2003a) for related work on the
vertical fragmentation of production. Vertical FDI is thought to be more likely when factor price differences across countries
are large, but the cost of shipping components is low.
3See Hanson et al. (2001) and Ekholm et al. (2007) for theory and evidence on export-platform FDI. Platform FDI is
seen as more likely when the host country offers low wages and good access to other markets.
4Baldwin and Okubo (2012) report a similar breakdown for Japanese MNCs, although export-platform motives appear
to be slightly more important, making up about 25% of the sales of Japanese affiliates.
5The share of affiliate sales to the U.S. market captures the extent of vertical FDI, in the sense that production has been
fragmented with headquarter services based in the home country, while plant production and assembly are conducted in the
FDI host country. See also Hanson et al. (2005) and Ramondo et al. (2012) who interpret this variable in a similar manner.
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We rationalize these empirical facts by developing a three-country model of heterogeneous firms in
the spirit of Melitz (2003) and Grossman et al. (2006). In the model, the world comprises two identical
large economies in the North (called “West” and “East”) and a lower-wage third country (“South”).
Upon entry, firms in each economy draw a productivity level that uniquely determines in equilibrium
where they locate their production, which markets they sell to, and whether they service those markets
via exports or FDI. Exporting incurs an iceberg transport cost, but requires a lower fixed cost than FDI.
In our setup, Northern firms that are sufficiently productive are able to sell both at home and export
abroad. The most efficient Northern firms, however, undertake FDI in South and will use their Southern
plant in equilibrium as a global production center for servicing all three markets.
Financial intermediation matters because firms require external finance for their fixed costs of produc-
tion. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that Southern suppliers have limited access to capital
due to imperfect credit markets, but that Northern firms do not face such constraints. Some prospective
Southern producers are thus unable to operate, even though they would make positive profits in the
absence of financial frictions. As a result, an improvement in financial development in the South fosters
entry by domestic firms and increases competition in the local market. This induces MNCs to orient
their sales away from the host country, toward servicing the third-country and home markets instead.
Moreover, the share of platform affiliate sales increases more than the share of vertical sales. This arises
in our model because MNCs headquartered in “West” face an additional margin of competition in their
home market, from Western firms that only serve the domestic market and which produce close substi-
tutes from the point of view of domestic consumers. These predictions from the model dovetail with the
evidence we find on the spatial composition of U.S. MNC sales.
We use this theoretical framework to guide and discipline our empirical analysis. Consistent with
the model’s predictions, we find robust and significant effects of host country financial development on
the respective sales shares when using: (i) aggregate MNC sales at the host-country level; (ii) affiliate-
level sales; and (iii) affiliate-level sales conditioning on unobserved MNC characteristics with parent-firm
fixed effects. We also control for other traditional determinants of multinational activity that are also
present in our model. These include the host’s market size (GDP), factor costs (GDP per capita and
factor endowments), and trade costs (bilateral distance to the U.S. and membership in regional trade
agreements). We further absorb systematic variation across sectors with industry fixed effects in all our
regressions. Finally, we account for cross-country differences in corporate tax rates and overall rule of
law to isolate the role of financial development from that of other institutional conditions.6
We employ two standard proxies for financial development in the FDI host country, namely: private
credit and stock market capitalization, each scaled by GDP. These measures capture the ease with
6See Desai et al. (2004a), Branstetter et al. (2006), and Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007) for evidence that low taxes and
strong host country institutions (such as secure property rights and lack of corruption) increase FDI. Navaretti and Venables
(2004, Chapter 6) and Blonigen (2005) review the literature on other country characteristics that affect FDI. These studies
typically focus on FDI levels as opposed to its composition.
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which local businesses can secure debt and equity financing, respectively. They are moreover arguably
exogenous from the perspective of each MNC affiliate, which gives us cause to believe that our empirical
results are picking up an effect running from financial development to the sales patterns of affiliates. To
bolster the case for this interpretation, we further show that the affiliate sales shares are more sensitive
to financial conditions in the host economy in sectors that require more external capital. It is precisely
in such sectors that better access to finance should raise competition from domestic firms the most. Last
but not least, we present direct evidence that better host country financial development is associated
with a larger number of establishments, as reported in the UNIDO Industrial Statistics, and that the
number of establishments predicted by this regression in turn exhibits the same partial correlations with
the spatial dimension of MNC affiliate sales that we have been highlighting. This is consistent with the
effects of financial development operating through the entry that it induces in the host economy.
This paper brings together and extends several different strands in the literature. A large and
growing body of work has shown that credit constraints severely impede economic activity along many
dimensions. The evidence here clearly indicates that financial development improves aggregate growth by
boosting firm entry, expansion along the intensive margin, and technology adoption. It also raises export
participation and aggregate export volumes. These effects are especially pronounced among small firms
and in sectors that are inherently more reliant on external capital.7 We incorporate these insights into
our model of financial market imperfections in the South, and examine their equilibrium implications for
the competitive environment there.
We address directly a separate line of research on the impact of host country financial conditions on
FDI. While frictions in external capital markets can limit the expansion of foreign affiliates to a certain
degree, it is known that MNCs can mitigate these constraints by employing internal capital markets
opportunistically (Feinberg and Phillips, 2004, Desai et al., 2004b). As a result, MNC subsidiaries are
less credit constrained than local firms and respond more to profitable growth opportunities.8 When
transacting with a supplier in a financially less developed country, firms may in fact choose to vertically
integrate the supplier in order to incentivize local investors to fund her operations (see for example,
Antra`s et al., 2007, Bustos, 2007, and Carluccio and Fally, 2012). While consistent with the findings in
this literature, our analysis shifts the focus away from the financing decisions of MNC affiliates to their
production and sales decisions.9
On this note, our paper contributes to a growing body of work that has sought to model the complex
global strategies available to MNCs. A key feature of this recent work has been its efforts to accommodate
7For example, see Rajan and Zingales (1998), Aghion et al. (2007), and Beck et al. (2005) on economic growth and
investment, and Beck (2003), Amiti and Weinstein (2009), and Manova (2013) on international trade.
8Desai et al. (2008) find that following large real exchange rate devaluations, U.S. affiliates abroad receive more financing
from their parent company which allows them to increase sales, while local producers contract or do not expand. Manova et
al. (2009) show that MNCs export disproportionately more than domestic firms in financially dependent sectors in China.
9See also Buch et al. (2009) who show that financially constrained firms are less likely to choose horizontal FDI over
direct exporting because of the higher associated fixed costs. They however do not consider other modes of FDI.
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hybrid motives behind FDI, instead of examining horizontal, vertical and platform FDI in isolation, in
order to obtain predictions for trade flows and multinational production that are rich enough to take to
the data (Markusen and Venables, 2007, Irarrazabal et al., 2012, Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012,
Arkolakis et al., 2012, Tintelnot, 2012). Our approach in this paper is more closely related to Yeaple
(2003a) and Grossman et al. (2006), in that we derive analytical results on how conditions in the FDI
recipient country affect the equilibrium behavior of prospective MNCs that are faced with a rich array
of operational options.
Finally, the mechanism we emphasize in our framework speaks to the literature on the interaction
between foreign affiliates and domestic firms in FDI host countries. On the one hand, MNC subsidiaries
could crowd out local producers if they raise competition levels and gain in local market share (Aitken and
Harrison, 1999, De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003). On the other hand, MNCs can generate productivity
spillovers in the host country and nudge indigenous companies to remove X-inefficiencies (Javorcik and
Spatareanu, 2009, Arnold et al., 2011). These beneficial effects appear stronger in nations with advanced
financial markets because of their greater capacity to allocate capital resources (Alfaro et al., 2004).
While these papers study the impact of FDI on the host economy, we instead explore the effects that
local financial development and increased competitive pressures can have on foreign multinationals.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the three-country model with hetero-
geneous firms, while Section 3 derives the comparative statics on the effect of host country financial
development on the spatial composition of MNC affiliate sales. Section 4 describes the data used in our
empirical analysis, and Section 5 presents these results. The last section concludes. Detailed proofs have
been relegated to the Appendix.
2 A Model of FDI with Host Country Credit Constraints
We develop a three-country model with heterogeneous firms to analyze how conditions in the FDI recipient
country systematically affect the sales decisions of MNC affiliates located there. We specifically focus on
the role of financial development and MNCs’ incentives to service the host market versus the home- or
third-country markets.
Consider a world of two identical countries in the developed North (“West” and “East”) and a low-
wage country in the developing “South”. Each economy features two sectors: a homogeneous good sector
(“agriculture”), and a differentiated goods sector (“manufacturing”). The homogeneous good is produced
using a constant returns to scale technology. This good is freely tradable across borders, and thus serves
as the global numeraire. In each country, the labor force is sufficiently large to ensure that agricultural
output is strictly positive in equilibrium. In what follows, we set our model up so that the two Northern
countries are symmetric in structure, as this will simplify the system of equations that describes the
equilibrium in the manufacturing sector.
4
Labor is the sole factor of production, with the nominal wage pinned down by the constant marginal
product of labor in the respective domestic agriculture sectors. Southern labor is less productive in
agriculture than Northern labor: While 1/ω workers are needed to make each unit of the homogeneous
good in the South, only one worker is required in the North. We thus normalize the nominal wage in the
two developed countries (West and East) to 1, so that the wage in South is ω < 1.
Utility: The utility function of a representative consumer from the developed North (subscript
n = e, w, for East and West respectively) is given by:
Un = y
1−µ
n
 ∑
j∈{e,w}
(∫
Ωnj
xnj(a)
α dGj(a)
) β
α

µ
β
, (2.1)
while the corresponding utility function for Southern consumers (subscript s) is:
Us = y
1−µ
s
 ∑
j∈{e,w,s}
(∫
Ωsj
xsj(a)
α dGj(a)
) β
α

µ
β
. (2.2)
Utility in country i (i ∈ {e, w, s}) is thus a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over consumption of the homogeneous
good (yi) and differentiated varieties of manufactures, where the share of expenditure spent on manufac-
tures is equal to the constant µ ∈ (0, 1). Here, xij(a) denotes the quantity of a country j manufactured
variety (indexed by a) that is consumed in country i. (As a rule of thumb, the first subscript identifies
the country of consumption, while the second subscript refers to the country of origin of the producing
firm.) We define Ωij to be the set of differentiated varieties from country j available in i. When i 6= j,
this set consists of all varieties exported from j to i, as well as varieties produced locally in i by country
j’s multinational affiliates if FDI takes place. Similarly, when i = j, Ωii is the union of all indigenous
varieties produced domestically, and all varieties produced by country i multinationals abroad that are
then re-exported back to the home market.
The sub-utility derived from manufactures is a two-layered Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate over the con-
sumption of varieties. We stipulate that 0 < β < α < 1, which translates into a home-bias assumption:
Manufactured varieties from the same country are closer substitutes than varieties drawn from different
countries. We further specify that South demands varieties from all three countries.10 By contrast,
Southern manufactures do not enter the utility function of Northern consumers. One could argue for
example that Southern goods do not cater to developed country tastes, or alternatively that the fixed
costs of exporting to the North are prohibitively high for all Southern firms. This simplifying assump-
tion allows us to examine the Southern industry without having to worry about feedback effects from
Northern demand for Southern goods.11
10Prior three-country models, such as Ekholm et al. (2003), Yeaple (2003a), and Grossman et al. (2006), have often
assumed that the size of the Southern market is negligible, in order to focus on the MNC’s decision over how to service the
two large Northern markets. In our model, however, Southern demand for Northern varieties is crucial for changes in the
level of competitiveness in the Southern market to affect the Northern industry equilibrium and MNCs’ behavior.
11This simplification does not alter our qualitative predictions: If Northern consumers also demand Southern goods, this
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Each differentiated variety is produced by a separate firm. Varieties are indexed by a, the labor
requirement per unit output. Upon paying the fixed cost of entry into the industry, every firm draws its
a from a distribution Gj(a) that represents the existing slate of technological possibilities in country j.
1/a is thus the firm’s labor productivity and the key dimension along which firms in the manufacturing
sector are heterogeneous.
Maximizing (2.1) and (2.2) respectively subject to the standard budget constraints implies the familiar
iso-elastic demand functions for each variety: xij = Aijpij(a)
−ε, where pij(a) denotes the price of the
country j variety in country i, and ε = 11−α > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties
from the same country. Given the symmetry between West and East, the expressions for aggregate
demand, Aij , in country i for manufactured varieties from j are:
Aww = Aee =
µEnP
ε−φ
ww
P 1−φww + P 1−φew
, (2.3)
Aew = Awe =
µEnP
ε−φ
ew
P 1−φww + P 1−φew
, (2.4)
Asw = Ase =
µEsP
ε−φ
sw
P 1−φss + 2P 1−φsw
, and (2.5)
Ass =
µEsP
ε−φ
ss
P 1−φss + 2P 1−φsw
, (2.6)
where P 1−εij =
∫
Ωij
pij(a)
1−ε dGj(a) is the ideal price index of varieties from country j faced by country
i. (Note that the above equations make use of the fact that P 1−εww = P 1−εee , P 1−εew = P 1−εwe and P 1−εsw =
P 1−εse , since West and East are symmetric.) Here, Ei is the total expenditure by consumers in i, and
Ew = Ee = En.
12 These aggregate expenditure levels are exogenous and equal to the nominal wage times
the size of the workforce in each country. Note also that φ = 11−β > 1 is the cross-country elasticity of
substitution between manufactured varieties, and ε > φ because α > β. This is precisely the statement
that manufactured varieties from the same country are closer substitutes in consumption than varieties
drawn from different countries. In particular, from (2.3) and (2.4), the fact that Western goods are not
equally substitutable for manufactured varieties from East (ε 6= φ) explains why demand for Western
goods differs in the two developed countries (Aww 6= Aew). As we will show below, the condition ε > φ will
play a role in signing various comparative statics related to the effect of Southern financial development.
2.1 Industry setup in the Northern countries
The structure of the Northern manufacturing sector builds on Helpman et al. (2004) and Grossman et
al. (2006). We describe the environment in West, with the situation in East being entirely symmetric.13
would further spur the entry of Southern firms following an improvement in Southern financial development. This would
serve to reinforce the competition effect in South between Northern and Southern manufacturing firms.
12While it may be natural to further assume that En > Es, namely that each Northern country is a larger consumer
market than South, this will not be necessary for our results.
13The corresponding equations for East can be obtained by interchanging the subscripts ‘w’ and ‘e’.
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Upon entering the industry, each firm in West obtains a unit cost draw, a, from the distribution Gn(a).
The firm then decides whether to engage in production or to exit entirely (which it does if it receives a
very low productivity draw). Should the firm choose to stay in, production for the home economy incurs
a per-period fixed cost of fD units of Western labor. One can interpret these fixed costs as headquarter
services such as managerial expertise or the recurring cost of maintaining equipment. At the start of
each period, firms require external financing to pay fD upfront. For simplicity, we assume that firms
cannot use retained earnings from previous periods because management has no control rights over these
revenues and must transfer them as dividends or profits to the firm’s owners. Firms thus borrow for each
period’s fixed costs at a (gross) interest rate of R > 1, set exogenously in an international capital market
that we do not model explicitly.
Firms charge a constant markup over marginal costs, so that the home price for a Western variety
is pww(a) =
a
α . Individual producers take the aggregate demand levels in each country as given. Profits
from sales in the domestic market are thus equal to:
piD(a) = (1− α)Aww
( a
α
)1−ε −RfD. (2.7)
In addition, firms that are sufficiently productive will contemplate exporting to East or South (or
both). Exporting to each foreign market incurs a per-period fixed cost of fX units of Western labor,
which capture for example the cost of maintaining an overseas distribution network. Exporting also
incurs an iceberg transport cost that raises prices by a multiplicative factor, τ > 1. The Western firm’s
profits from exporting to East and South are thus respectively:
piXN (a) = (1− α)Aew
(τa
α
)1−ε −RfX , and (2.8)
piXS(a) = (1− α)Asw
(τa
α
)1−ε −RfX . (2.9)
The FDI decision: Alternatively, Northern firms that are sufficiently productive can choose to go
multinational. Establishing an overseas plant confers several advantages. It allows the MNC to move
closer to its foreign markets (saving on shipping costs), as well as to lower its wage bill if it locates
in the South. However, setting up a production facility abroad requires a high per-period fixed cost
equal to fI units of Northern labor. A Western MNC thus faces a wide array of options: Apart from
servicing the host country market, the Western headquarters may also want to use the foreign affiliate as
an export platform to a third country or even back to its home (Western) market. We assume that such
re-exporting incurs both the above-mentioned per-period fixed cost, fX , of maintaining a distribution
network, as well as the same iceberg transport cost, τ .
To keep the analysis tractable (and to economize on the number of relevant productivity cutoffs), we
focus on the case in which: (i) Western firms that are sufficiently productive conduct FDI only in the
low-wage South and not in East; and (ii) if a Southern affiliate is established, it automatically becomes
the Western firm’s global production center servicing all three countries. Below, we show that two
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conditions, namely τω < 1 and fX < fD < fI , suffice to ensure that this will be the optimal strategy for
Western MNCs. Intuitively, the Southern wage ω must be lower than the Northern wage after adjusting
for transport costs for MNCs to use South as an export platform to the Northern markets. The second
assumption captures the idea that the fixed cost of an export distribution network is typically smaller
than the fixed cost of running a domestic plant, which in turn is smaller than the fixed cost of running
an overseas production facility.
Consider then a Western firm that is sufficiently productive to contemplate FDI. If this firm already
operates an affiliate in South, it is more profitable to use it as an export platform to East, rather than
servicing East via direct exports from West or via FDI in East. This follows from the inequality:
(1− α)Aew
(τaω
α
)1−ε −RfX > max{(1− α)Aew (τa
α
)1−ε −RfX , (1− α)Aew ( a
α
)1−ε −RfI} ,
which holds since τω < 1 < τ and fX < fI (bearing in mind that 1− ε < 0). In particular, this rules out
the possibility of the MNC establishing production plants in both South and East.
Conditional on setting up a Southern affiliate, it is also optimal to use it to supply even the firm’s
home market. This follows from:
(1− α)Aww
(τaω
α
)1−ε −RfX > (1− α)Aww ( a
α
)1−ε −RfD,
which holds since τω < 1 and fX < fD. Thus, it is more profitable to produce in South and export to
West than to incur the fixed costs and higher wages of production at home.
It remains to check that the optimal decision for the Western MNC is to locate its overseas affiliate
in South, rather than in East. This requires that total profits from servicing all three countries out of a
production plant in South must exceed the profits from setting up a plant in East instead:
(1− α)Aww
(τaω
α
)1−ε −RfX + (1− α)Aew (τaω
α
)1−ε −RfX + (1− α)Asw (aω
α
)1−ε −RfI
> max
{
(1− α)Aww
( a
α
)1−ε −RfD, (1− α)Aww (τa
α
)1−ε −RfX}
. . .+ (1− α)Aew
( a
α
)1−ε −RfI + (1− α)Asw (τa
α
)1−ε −RfX .
Note that if FDI is undertaken in East, the home market (West) can be supplied either through domestic
production or re-exports from East, while South would be serviced by exports from the developed North.
The expression on the right-hand side of the above inequality captures total profits from this alternative
production mode. Once again, it is easy to check that this inequality holds since τω < 1, ω < 1, ω < τ
and fX < fD. It is thus not optimal to conduct FDI in the high-wage East.
In sum, the conditions τω < 1 and fX < fD < fI guarantee that the FDI decision is in effect a
decision over whether to relocate the firm’s global production center to South, with only headquarter
activities being retained in West. Under these parameter assumptions, and taking into account revenues
from all three markets, profits from FDI in South for a firm with productivity 1/a are therefore:
piI(a) = (1− α)Asw
(aω
α
)1−ε
+ (1− α)(Aww +Aew)
(τaω
α
)1−ε −R(fI + 2fX). (2.10)
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Patterns of production: Each firm’s productivity level determines where it manufactures and
sells its goods. Firms produce at home for the local market if profits from (2.7) are positive. Solving
piD(a) = 0, this pins down a zero-profit value, aD, which is the maximum labor input coefficient at which
domestic production is sustainable. Similarly, setting piXN (a) = 0 yields a cutoff level, aXN , below which
exporting to East is profitable. Solving piXS(a) = 0 delivers the analogous cutoff, aXS , for exporting to
South. These three thresholds are given by:
a1−εD =
RfD
(1− α)Aww(1/α)1−ε , (2.11)
a1−εXN =
RfX
(1− α)Aew(τ/α)1−ε , and (2.12)
a1−εXS =
RfX
(1− α)Asw(τ/α)1−ε . (2.13)
There is a fourth cutoff, aI , that identifies when FDI becomes feasible. Going multinational is more
profitable than basing production in West when piI(a) > piD(a) + piXN (a) + piXS(a). Solving this as an
equality delivers the following expression for aI :
a1−εI =
R(fI − fD)
(1− α)[Aww(( τωα )1−ε − ( 1α )1−ε) +Aew(( τωα )1−ε − ( τα )1−ε) +Asw((ωα )1−ε − ( τα )1−ε)]
. (2.14)
Note that the conditions fI > fD, τω < 1, ω < 1 < τ , and ε > 1 ensure that aI > 0.
To lend some realistic structure to the industry equilibrium, we stipulate that 0 < a1−εD < a
1−ε
XN <
a1−εXS < a
1−ε
I . This describes a natural sorting of West’s firms to the various production modes. The upper
panel of Figure 1 illustrates this sorting pattern using a1−ε as a proxy for firm productivity. The least
efficient firms with a1−ε < a1−εD have labor input requirements that are too high and exit the industry
upon observing their productivity draw. Firms with productivity levels between a1−εD and a
1−ε
XN supply
only the domestic West market. Using the cutoff expressions in (2.11) and (2.12), the assumption that
a1−εD < a
1−ε
XN reduces to τ
ε−1( fXAew ) >
fD
Aww
, so that export costs (normalized by the level of demand in
East) must be sufficiently bigger than the fixed cost of domestic production.14 Next, those firms that are
even more productive, with a1−εXN < a
1−ε < a1−εXS , are able to overcome the additional costs of exporting
to East, but not to South. Based on (2.12) and (2.13), the ranking a1−εXN < a
1−ε
XS holds if market demand
for Western varieties is greater in East than in South, Aew > Asw. Firms with a
1−ε
XS < a
1−ε < a1−εI can
further export to the smaller Southern market.15 Finally, the most productive firms with a1−ε > a1−εI
successfully conduct FDI in South.
Figure 2 provides an alternative illustration of the structure of the Western industry that focuses
on the economic relations in our three-country world. Firms with a1−ε < a1−εI base their production
14To be precise, one needs to substitute the values of Aww and Aew in general equilibrium into this inequality for the full
restriction. Note also that this condition is not inconsistent with the earlier requirement that fX < fD.
15The parameter restriction that guarantees that a1−εXS < a
1−ε
I does not simplify neatly. Intuitively, it requires that the
fixed cost of FDI, fI , be sufficiently large so that FDI is only considered by the most productive firms.
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activities in West, and undertake exports to East and even to South if they are sufficiently productive
(Figure 2a). On the other hand, the most productive firms with a1−ε > a1−εI become multinationals.
While these firms are still headquartered in West, their production activities are located in South, from
which they service all three markets (Figure 2b).
2.2 Industry setup in the Southern country
The structure of the Southern manufacturing industry is simpler, with Southern firms producing only for
domestic consumption. (Recall from (2.1) that Southern manufactures do not enter the utility function
of Northern countries.) The per-period fixed cost of domestic production is fS units of Southern labor,
and we assume once again that Southern firms need to borrow at the start of each period to finance these
fixed costs.
However, Southern firms face credit constraints, arising from institutional weaknesses that lead to
imperfect protection for lenders against default risk. Following Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004),
we model this moral hazard problem by assuming that firms lose a fraction η ∈ [0, 1] of their revenues
if they choose to default. Thus, while it is tempting to default to avoid loan repayment, it is a costly
option. The fraction η can be thought of as the pecuniary cost of actions taken to hide the firm’s full
financial resources from lenders. A Southern firm with input coefficient a would therefore default if and
only if the associated revenue loss is smaller than the cost of servicing the loan:
η(1− α)Ass
(aω
α
)1−ε
< RfSω,
We interpret the parameter η as capturing the degree of financial development in South: When credit
institutions are stronger, η is higher and it is more difficult for firms to hide their revenues and assets.
The default condition yields a productivity threshold above which firms have access to credit:
a1−εS =
1
η
RfSω
(1− α)Ass(ω/α)1−ε . (2.15)
We assume that lenders can observe a, and hence only Southern firms with a1−ε > a1−εS will be able
to commence production. When η = 1, a1−εS equals the cutoff for domestic entry that would prevail in
the absence of credit market imperfections. When η < 1, however, the productivity bar is higher, as
illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 1. This is because firms with productivity levels slightly lower
than a1−εS would earn positive profits, but cannot credibly commit to repay their loans. As η increases
toward 1, this distortion from credit constraints vanishes.16
2.3 Industry equilibrium
We now close the model by specifying the conditions that govern firm entry in each country. For this, it
is convenient to define Vi(a) =
∫ a
0 a˜
1−εdGi(a˜), as this expression will show up repeatedly.
16We have also considered an extension (available on request) in which Northern multinationals need to borrow in the
host country’s financial markets for some portion of their Southern affiliate’s activities. Our results continue to hold so long
as the extent of these credit frictions is not too large.
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Free entry: Prospective entrants in country i’s manufacturing sector incur an upfront entry cost
equal to fEi units of country i labor. This is a once-off cost that firms pay ex ante before they can
obtain their productivity draw 1/a.17 On the exit side, firms face an exogenous probability, δ, of “dying”
and leaving the industry in each period. For an equilibrium with a constant measure of firms in each
country, the cost of entry must equal expected profits. Using the profit functions (2.7)-(2.10) and the
cutoffs (2.11)-(2.14), and integrating the expressions for expected profits over the distribution Gi(a), one
can write down the free-entry conditions for Western and Southern firms as:
fEn =
1
1− δ
[
(1− α)Aww
(
1
α
)1−ε
(Vn(aD)− Vn(aI))−RfD(Gn(aD)−Gn(aI)) (2.16)
. . .+ (1− α)Aew
( τ
α
)1−ε
(Vn(aXN )− Vn(aI))−RfX(Gn(aXN )−Gn(aI))
. . .+ (1− α)Asw
( τ
α
)1−ε
(Vn(aXS)− Vn(aI))−RfX(Gn(aXS)−Gn(aI))
. . . +(1− α)
(
Aww
(τω
α
)1−ε
+Aew
(τω
α
)1−ε
+Asw
(ω
α
)1−ε)
Vn(aI)−R(fI + 2fX)Gn(aI)
]
, and
fEsω =
1
1− δ
[
(1− α)Ass
(ω
α
)1−ε
Vs(aS)−RfSωGs(aS)
]
. (2.17)
Finally, we denote the measure of firms in country i’s manufacturing sector by Ni.
18 The definition
of the ideal price index (P 1−εij =
∫
Ωij
pij(a)
1−ε dGj(a)) then implies:
P 1−εww = Nn
[(
1
α
)1−ε
(Vn(aD)− Vn(aI)) +
(τω
α
)1−ε
Vn(aI)
]
, (2.18)
P 1−εew = Nn
[( τ
α
)1−ε
(Vn(aXN )− Vn(aI)) +
(τω
α
)1−ε
Vn(aI)
]
, (2.19)
P 1−εsw = Nn
[( τ
α
)1−ε
(Vn(aXS)− Vn(aI)) +
(ω
α
)1−ε
Vn(aI)
]
, and (2.20)
P 1−εss = Ns
[(ω
α
)1−ε
Vs(aS)
]
. (2.21)
The equilibrium of the model is thus defined by the system of equations (2.3)-(2.6) and (2.11)-(2.21)
in the 15 unknowns, Aww, Aew, Asw, Ass, aD, aXN , aXS , aI , aS , Nn, Ns, Pww, Pew, Psw and Pss. While
we cannot solve for all of these variables in closed form, we can nevertheless derive precise results for
some key comparative statics.
17One can show that our results are robust to subjecting the fixed cost of entry in the South, fEs, to borrowing constraints
too. Intuitively, an improvement in financial development in the South would spur more entry by Southern firms, which
would work in the same direction as the effects in our baseline model.
18Following Melitz (2003), for Ni to be constant in steady state, the expected mass of successful entrants needs to equal
the mass of firms that dies exogenously in each period. The mass of firms that attempts entry in each period in country i,
Nenti , is thus pinned down by the equations N
ent
n Gn(aD) = δNn and N
ent
s Gs(aS) = δNs.
11
3 Host country financial development and the industry equilibrium
How does financial development in the FDI host country affect multinational activity there? Using our
model, we now determine how changes in η affect the spatial distribution of Western MNC affiliate sales
emanating from South. This will in turn depend on the effect of η on the various productivity cutoffs.
To foreshadow our key results, we will show that a rise in η increases both a1−εXS and a
1−ε
I , while at the
same time reducing a1−εD and a
1−ε
XN . Intuitively, a stronger credit market in South induces more Southern
firms to enter its manufacturing sector, thereby raising the productivity bar for Western firms to enter
the Southern market. The new equilibrium thus features a smaller Western manufacturing presence in
South, and tilts West’s firms toward serving the developed markets instead.
To facilitate the derivations, we explicitly parameterize the set of technological possibilities in the
manufacturing sector. As is common in this literature, we assume that productivity 1/a is distributed
Pareto with shape parameter k and support [1/a¯i,∞) for each country i.19 (Recall that a lower k
corresponds to a thicker right-tail in the productivity distribution.) This distributional assumption
yields convenient expressions for Gi and Vi:
Gi(a) =
(
a
a¯i
)k
, and (3.1)
Vi(a) =
k
k − ε+ 1
(
ak−ε+1
a¯ki
)
. (3.2)
Helpman et al. (2004) show that if the underlying productivity distribution is Pareto with shape
parameter k, then the distribution of observed firm sales will be Pareto with shape parameter k− ε+ 1.
We therefore assume that k > ε − 1, which is necessary to deliver a finite variance for the distribution
of firm sales. In essence, this requires that the distribution of firm productivities not place too large a
mass on obtaining high productivity draws.20
3.1 Impact on industry cutoffs and market demand levels
We first establish how an improvement in Southern financial development systematically shifts the pro-
ductivity cutoffs that sort firms, as well as the aggregate demand levels in each market. Note that
equations (2.15) and (2.17) precisely pin down Ass and aS for the equilibrium in South. Totally differ-
entiating these two equations, we obtain:
Lemma 1: daSdη > 0 and
dAss
dη < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
19One might presume that 1/a¯s < 1/a¯n, so that Southern manufacturing is on average less productive, but we will not
need this assumption for the proofs. We will however require that a¯s and a¯n both be sufficiently large, so that all relevant
cutoffs lie within the interior of the support of the distributions that they are drawn from. Similarly, our proofs do not
require the same shape parameter in West and South, but we have assumed this to simplify notation.
20Helpman et al. (2004) also use European firm-level data to quantify the goodness of fit of the Pareto distribution in
describing firm sales. They typically find that k > ε− 1.
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Intuitively, a rising cost of default in the South alleviates the moral hazard problem, and hence more
Southern firms gain access to financial credit. This lowers the productivity cutoff a1−εS for entry into the
local market, as illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 3. However, the free-entry condition (2.17)
requires the expected profitability of a Southern firm to remain constant. Average demand for each
Southern product, Ass, must subsequently fall.
Since Northern and Southern varieties are substitutes in consumption in the South, financial devel-
opment there also affects each developed country’s manufacturing sector. Specifically, the effects on the
productivity cutoffs and demand levels relevant to Western firms are described in the following lemma;
by symmetry, these comparative statics also apply to Eastern firms:
Lemma 2: (i) 1aXN
daXN
dη >
1
aD
daD
dη > 0; (ii)
1
aXS
daXS
dη <
1
aI
daI
dη < 0; (iii)
1
Aew
dAew
dη >
1
Aww
dAww
dη > 0;
and (iv) dAswdη < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
While the formal proof of Lemma 2 is fairly extended, the key shifts are very intuitive and are
illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 3. Tougher competition in the Southern market decreases
South’s demand for each Western differentiated variety. This lowers Asw, and correspondingly raises
the productivity bars a1−εXS and a
1−ε
I for Western firms seeking to penetrate the Southern market either
through exporting or horizontal FDI. However, since the fixed cost of entry, fEn, remains constant,
the free-entry condition (2.16) implies that total profits from sales in the Northern markets (West and
East) must increase. The improvement in Southern financial development thus tilts West’s firms toward
serving the developed country markets: The productivity cutoffs a1−εD and a
1−ε
XN both fall, while aggregate
demand levels in West and East, Aww and Aew, both rise. The parameter assumption ε > φ plays a subtle
role in this logic: The output of a given Southern firm must be a closer substitute for other Southern
varieties than are varieties from the North, so that Northern goods are more easily displaced from South’s
consumption basket with the entry of more competing Southern firms.
We can moreover show that the proportional shift of the a1−εXN cutoff is larger than that of the a
1−ε
D
cutoff. Being closer to the a1−εXS and a
1−ε
I thresholds, Western firms with productivity levels around a
1−ε
XN
are more directly affected by the contraction in Southern demand. Similarly, the a1−εXS cutoff increases pro-
portionally more than a1−εI because the most productive Western firms (with a
1−ε > a1−εI ) are insulated
to some extent from the negative demand shock in South. Compared to firms with a1−εXS < a
1−ε < a1−εI ,
they too benefit from higher demand in the Northern markets, but enjoy the lower wage costs in South.
3.2 The spatial distribution of sales: Firm-level predictions
These shifts in the productivity cutoffs and market demand levels allow us to sign the impact of Southern
financial development on MNC sales. We define several quantities of interest that characterize the spatial
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distribution of these sales. For a given affiliate in South with productivity 1/a, sales to the local market
amount to HORI(a) ≡ (1 − α)Asw
(
aω
α
)1−ε
. We refer to these as horizontal sales, since they allow the
multinational to avoid transport costs while servicing the Southern market. Export-platform sales to
third-country destinations (in our case, East) are defined as PLAT (a) ≡ (1 − α)Aew
(
τaω
α
)1−ε
. Finally,
sales back to the Western home market equal V ERT (a) ≡ (1−α)Aww
(
τaω
α
)1−ε
. These capture the extent
of vertical FDI in the sense that production has been fragmented across borders: While headquarter
inputs (embodied in fI) are provided in the Western headquarters, production and assembly occur
in the South, taking advantage of lower factor costs there. Naturally, the affiliate’s total sales are
TOT (a) = HORI(a) + PLAT (a) + V ERT (a).
Applying these definitions, the following three expressions describe the breakdown of affiliate sales
by destination:
HORI(a)
TOT (a)
=
(
1 + τ1−ε
Aew
Asw
+ τ1−ε
Aww
Asw
)−1
, (3.3)
PLAT (a)
TOT (a)
=
(
1 + τ ε−1
Asw
Aew
+
Aww
Aew
)−1
, and (3.4)
V ERT (a)
TOT (a)
=
(
1 + τ ε−1
Asw
Aww
+
Aew
Aww
)−1
. (3.5)
We can now state the following result regarding the spatial distribution of MNC sales:
Proposition 1 Consider a Western multinational with a production affiliate in the South. Suppose
that the South undergoes a small improvement in financial development, after which this firm remains a
multinational. In response to this increase in η:
(i) HORI(a) decreases, while both PLAT (a) and V ERT (a) increase; and
(ii) HORI(a)TOT (a) decreases, while both
PLAT (a)
TOT (a) and
V ERT (a)
TOT (a) increase.
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
The intuition behind this proposition builds on the logic of Lemma 2. The changes in sales levels,
HORI(a), PLAT (a), and V ERT (a), are driven by changes in demand levels, Asw, Aew, and Aww, in
the markets that the multinational serves. When credit constraints in South are eased, the demand in
South for Western goods drops due to the increased competition from local firms. Hence, horizontal sales
into South, as well as their share in total sales, both decline. At the same time, demand levels in East
and West rise in equilibrium, which impels the multinational toward servicing the developed Northern
markets. This prompts an increase in platform and vertical sales both in absolute levels and relative to
total sales.
In fact, the model delivers the further prediction that the increase in the MNC’s export-platform
sales exceeds that in its sales back to West, in both absolute and relative terms:
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Lemma 3: (i) ddηPLAT (a) >
d
dηV ERT (a) > 0; and (ii)
d
dη
PLAT (a)
TOT (a) >
d
dη
V ERT (a)
TOT (a) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
Platform sales rise more than vertical sales for a simple reason: The multinational faces tougher
competition in its own home market than in East. This occurs because Western varieties are closer
substitutes in consumption for the MNC’s goods than Eastern varieties (since ε > φ), and a margin of
Western firms (with productivity a1−εD < a
1−ε < a1−εXN ) sell only at home but not in East.
3.3 The spatial distribution of sales: Aggregate predictions
Apart from firm-level predictions, our model also allows us to deduce the effects of host country financial
development on sales volumes at the industry level. For this, we define the aggregate horizontal, platform
and vertical sales of Western MNCs as:
HORI ≡ Nn
∫ aI
0
HORI(a)dGn(a) = Nn(1− α)Asw
(ω
α
)1−ε
Vn(aI), (3.6)
PLAT ≡ Nn
∫ aI
0
PLAT (a)dGn(a) = Nn(1− α)Aew
(τω
α
)1−ε
Vn(aI), and (3.7)
V ERT ≡ Nn
∫ aI
0
V ERT (a)dGn(a) = Nn(1− α)Aww
(τω
α
)1−ε
Vn(aI), (3.8)
where we have integrated over the measure of Western firms with a1−ε > a1−εI that are productive enough
to go multinational. Changes in η affect these industry outcomes as follows:
Proposition 2 Consider sales aggregated over all Western multinationals with an affiliate in the South.
In response to an improvement in financial development η in South:
(i) Nn, HORI, PLAT , and V ERT all decrease; and
(ii) HORITOT decreases, while both
PLAT
TOT and
V ERT
TOT increase.
Proof. See Appendix 8.5.
It is useful to discuss part (ii) of this proposition first. Observe that the shares of horizontal, platform
and vertical sales for an individual firm in (3.3)-(3.5) are all independent of its productivity level, 1/a.
It follows immediately that these sales shares also describe the industry as a whole, namely: HORITOT =
HORI(a)
TOT (a) ,
PLAT
TOT =
PLAT (a)
TOT (a) , and
V ERT
TOT =
V ERT (a)
TOT (a) , so that our model carries the same implications
for these aggregate shares as it does at the affiliate level. Once again, an improvement in financial
development in the South intensifies competition locally. This leads Western firms to re-direct their sales
away from the South toward the developed North instead, and this effect manifests itself in the aggregate
sales shares.
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This competition effect also explains part (i) of the proposition. The easing of financial constraints in
the South induces more entry by local competitors and reduces the ex ante expected profits of Western
firms. This leads to a decrease in the measure of Western firms. As for the effect of η on the aggregate
sales levels, this works through three channels as seen from equations (3.6)-(3.8): (i) the productivity
cutoff for FDI, a1−εI ; (ii) the measure of Western firms, Nn; and (iii) the demand levels in each market,
Asw, Aew, and Aww. The first two channels capture the extensive margin of FDI sales, since they operate
through the entry or exit of Western MNCs, while the third channel reflects the intensive margin of
existing affiliates’ sales. It is clear that the effect of a higher η on the extensive margin is to lower HORI,
PLAT , and V ERT , as it raises the productivity bar for FDI in South, so that VN (aI) drops (Lemma
2), and it also decreases Nn (as we have just seen). In the case of horizontal sales, this negative effect
on the extensive margin is reinforced by a reduction in Asw, and HORI clearly falls. It turns out that
the decline on the extensive margin also dominates the increases on the intensive margin from Aew and
Aww, so that both PLAT and V ERT fall unambiguously as well.
4 Data Description
4.1 U.S. Multinational Activity
We turn next to test the empirical predictions of the model using confidential data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. This dataset provides detailed
financial and operational data for all U.S. multinational firms and their affiliates abroad for the 1989-2009
period. All foreign business enterprises in which a U.S. national holds at least a 10% ownership stake
are required by law to respond to the survey in benchmark years. Our empirical analysis focuses on the
subset of non-bank affiliates of non-bank U.S. parents.
The BEA conducts benchmark surveys every five years covering the universe of U.S. foreign affiliates;
our sample includes benchmark surveys in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009. By contrast, survey partic-
ipation in non-benchmark year is subject to size thresholds, as only affiliates with sales greater than a
predetermined threshold are required to report. To mitigate issues related to sample selection, we there-
fore focus only on benchmark years for our aggregate analysis. However, in affiliate-level regressions to
follow, we incorporate the full panel of observations from the annual survey, simply omitting any missing
observations or imputed values. Although we face an unbalanced panel of affiliates using this approach,
we have separately confirmed that all of our results hold when using affiliate-level data solely from the
comprehensive benchmark years (results available on request).
The BEA data contain information detailing the spatial distribution of multinationals’ affiliate sales.
In addition to recording the total sales (“gross operating revenues, excluding sales taxes”) of each affiliate
abroad (TOT (a)), the survey captures sales according the following categories: (i) local sales in the host
country market, (ii) sales to the U.S., and (iii) sales to other destinations. We use these to form our
16
baseline measures of horizontal (HORI(a)), vertical (V ERT (a)) and export-platform (PLAT (a)) sales
respectively. Dividing by TOT (a), we obtain the share of each activity in total affiliate sales. Within
each category, the BEA data further distinguish between sales to other company affiliates and sales to
unaffiliated customers. We will make use of this additional detail to construct alternative proxies for
horizontal, vertical, and platform FDI in robustness checks.
Table 1 summarizes the variation in these MNC sales shares for the first and last benchmark years in
our panel. In 1989, there were 14,042 U.S.-owned affiliates in 132 countries which belonged to 2,119 parent
firms. By 2009, these numbers had changed slightly to 16,478, 142 and 1,892 respectively. The spatial
distribution of MNC sales remained fairly stable over this period, with a slight rise in third-country sales
at the expense of local sales. In 2009, horizontal sales contributed by far the most to affiliate revenues
at 73%. Platform sales accounted for 19%, with sales back to the U.S. taking up the remaining 8%.
These averages however mask substantial variation in MNC activity across firms and host countries; the
standard deviations around these three means reached 38%, 33% and 22% respectively.
4.2 Host Country Characteristics
We use two standard measures in the literature to capture the degree of financial development in FDI
recipient countries. The amount of credit extended by banks and other financial intermediaries to the
private sector summarizes access to debt financing. Stock market capitalization, on the other hand,
represents the total value of publicly traded companies and thus indicates access to equity financing. Both
measures are normalized by national GDP to make them comparable across countries; these variables
are drawn from Beck et al. (2009). While these are outcome-based measures that capture the actual
availability of external capital in an economy, they also reflect on the ability of local institutions to
support formal lending activity and enforce financial contracts.
Financial development varies significantly across the 95 host countries and 21 years in our sample,
as reported in Appendix Table 1. The mean levels of private credit and stock market capitalization are
0.51 and 0.56 in the panel, with standard deviations of 0.44 and 0.68 respectively. While the time-series
variation in these measures is important, the cross-sectional dispersion is much greater. For example,
the standard deviation of private credit across countries was 0.62 in 2009. By contrast, the standard
deviation of private credit over the 1989-2009 period was only 0.15 for the average economy.
Our empirical analysis conditions on a number of control variables, which we proceed to describe. Real
GDP and GDP per capita are taken from the Penn World Tables, Version 7.0. We calculate measures
of physical capital per worker from this same source using the perpetual inventory method.21 Similarly,
we use the updated country schooling data from Barro and Lee (2010) to construct measures of human
capital per worker, using the methodology of Hall and Jones (1999). We also include several commonly-
21We set the initial capital stock equal to I0/(g + δ), where I0 is investment in the initial year, g is the average growth
rate of investment over the first ten years, and δ = 0.06 is the assumed depreciation rate.
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used controls that capture trade costs. The CEPII provides data on bilateral distance to the U.S., based
on the great circle formula distance between the major population centers of the U.S. and each host
country. Information on trade agreements was taken from Rose (2004), updated by direct reference to
the WTO website. We created 11 regional trade agreement (RTA) dummies indicating whether a given
host country was a RTA partner of the U.S. (for example, through NAFTA), as well as 8 separate dummies
for whether the country was a member of a major multilateral agreement (namely, GATT/WTO, EU,
EFTA, CARICOM, CACM, ASEAN, ASEAN-China, and Mercosur).22 We also control for a general
rule of law index, taken from La Porta et al. (1998). Finally, we use BEA data on the actual taxes paid
by U.S. multinationals abroad to infer the average tax rate they face in each host country. All of these
country measures are collected annually, with the exception of bilateral distance and rule of law, which
do not vary over time.
5 Empirical Evidence
The patterns of U.S. multinational activity abroad are in fact strongly supportive of the predictions
of our model, specifically those related to the influence of host country financial development on the
spatial dimension of affiliate sales. In what follows, we aim to explain affiliate sales destined for the
local market, the U.S., and third-country markets, expressed respectively as a fraction of total affiliate
sales, focusing on these shares for two reasons. First, dividing by total sales helps to make the data
more comparable across affiliates and across countries, this being a convenient way to account for effects
that might be related to firm or country scale. Second, the affiliate-level data on horizontal, vertical and
export-platform sales contains a fair number of zeros in practice, so this approach will allow us to avoid
dropping these observations (had we used log sales instead as the dependent variable).
Before proceeding to a rigorous empirical analysis, we offer a motivating example of the systematic
patterns in the data. Figure 4 illustrates the sales composition of MNC affiliates based in three host
countries: Brazil (in 1999), Chile (in 1994), and Norway (in 1989). These economies were chosen as
they are comparable in terms of GDP, GDP per capita and distance to the U.S., but have dramatically
different levels of financial development. Private credit as a share of GDP was 0.29 in Brazil, 0.43 in Chile,
and 0.61 in Norway, which correspond roughly to the 40th, 55th, and 70th percentiles of the distribution
of private credit in our panel.
For each recipient country, Figure 4 shows the share of aggregate MNC sales (summed across all
affiliates) destined for the local market, shipped back to the U.S., or exported to other destinations.
The striking pattern that emerges is that the share of horizontal sales decreases monotonically with the
22The 11 RTAs that the U.S. was a signatory to in our sample are: US-Israel, NAFTA, US-Jordan, US-Singapore,
US-Chile, US-Australia, US-Morocco, CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America), US-Bahrain, US-Peru, and US-
Oman. The abbreviations for the multilateral trade agreements are: EU = European Union, EFTA = European Free Trade
Area, NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement, CARICOM = Caribbean Community, CACM = Central American
Common Market, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
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host’s financial development. By contrast, export-platform FDI grows quickly with private credit. While
the share of vertical sales also rises as local credit conditions improve, this effect is more moderate.
Although only suggestive, these regularities are consistent with our theoretical predictions and anticipate
our econometric results below.
5.1 Baseline Results
We formally test our model’s implications with the following specifications:(
HORI
TOT
)
ikt
= αH + βHORIFinDevtit + ΓHXit + δk,Hϕk + δt,Hϕt + εikt,H , (5.1)(
PLAT
TOT
)
ikt
= αP + βPLATFinDevtit + ΓPXit + δk,Pϕk + δt,Pϕt + εikt,P , and (5.2)(
V ERT
TOT
)
ikt
= αV + βV ERTFinDevtit + ΓVXit + δk,V ϕk + δt,V ϕt + εikt,V . (5.3)
The dependent variables in these three regressions summarize the spatial distribution of multinational
sales aggregated across all U.S.-owned affiliates in host country i that operate in sector k.23
(
HORI
TOT
)
ikt
denotes the share of total affiliate sales that remain in the local market, in year t. Similarly,
(
PLAT
TOT
)
ikt
and
(
V ERT
TOT
)
ikt
reflect the share of total affiliate sales destined for the U.S. and for third-country markets
respectively. Since we are interested in aggregates at the level of the host country, we base this initial
analysis on the five benchmark years in our panel which comprehensively cover the universe of U.S.
multinational affiliates abroad (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009).
Importantly, we include industry fixed effects, ϕk, to control for any unobserved industry character-
istics that might affect firms’ incentives to pursue horizontal, vertical or export-platform FDI. In the
context of our model, these capture in particular the role of economies of scale (the fixed costs) in pro-
duction or exporting, which could affect the attractiveness of FDI (relative to exporting) as the means
for a firm to service a given market. In addition, the ϕk’s flexibly account for other sector-specific deter-
minants of MNC activity that are outside the scope of our model. Similarly, the composition of MNC
sales might vary over time for reasons unrelated to the core mechanisms of our model. For example,
broad reductions in transportation or communication costs might make vertical and platform FDI more
profitable across all host countries and sectors. We therefore absorb such changes over time with year
fixed effects, ϕt.
Our main explanatory variable of interest is FinDevtit, the level of financial development in host
country i in year t. In most of the regression tables that follow, we report results using the ratio of
private credit to GDP to capture FinDevtit in Columns 1-3, while using the ratio of stock market
capitalization to GDP in Columns 4-6. To isolate the effects of financial development from those of
other country characteristics that might be correlated with it, we include a large set of country-level
23The BEA surveys report the primary industry affiliation for each multinational affiliate in the NAICS 4-digit industry
classification. This allows us to construct the relevant sales shares at that level of disaggregation.
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controls Xit, which we describe below. Finally, we cluster our standard errors by host country, to allow
for unobserved correlated shocks to the sales shares across years.
From Proposition 2, we expect that βHORI < 0 < βV ERT < βPLAT . In other words, host country
financial development should be negatively correlated with the share of local in total sales. In contrast,
it should be positively correlated with the share of platform sales and, to a lesser degree, with sales back
to the MNC’s home market. Table 2 runs the specifications in equations (5.1)-(5.3), and confirms that
these three predictions are strongly supported in the aggregate data. Ceteris paribus, affiliates sell a lower
fraction of their output in the local economy when the host country boasts more mature credit and stock
markets (βHORI = −0.080 in Column 1, and βHORI = −0.051 in Column 4, both significant at the 1%
level). Conversely, they direct more of their sales to third-country destinations and back to the U.S. in
such environments (Columns 2-3 and 5-6).24 Moreover, our point estimates suggest that export-platform
FDI is indeed more sensitive to FinDevtit than vertical FDI. In particular, βV ERT = 0.025 < 0.036 =
βPLAT for the private credit measure of FinDevtit, while βV ERT = 0.015 < 0.026 = βPLAT for the stock
market capitalization measure.25
To gauge the economic significance of these effects, consider a host nation where access to private
credit improves from the level of the 10th percentile country to that of the 90th percentile country in
our sample. Based on the Table 2 point estimates, this improvement in financial development would
be associated with a decrease in the share of horizontal sales by 0.080 × (1.05 − 0.11) = 0.075 in the
typical sector; the corresponding increases in the share of platform sales and in the share of return sales
to the U.S. would respectively be 0.034 and 0.024. This represents a fairly sizeable reorientation in MNC
activity, particularly when viewed from the perspective of platform and vertical sales, given that these
latter two shares average 0.18 and 0.07 across our entire panel.26
We next exploit the full dimensionality in the data and evaluate the predictions of our model at
the level of the affiliate. We now calculate the
(
HORI
TOT
)
fikt
,
(
PLAT
TOT
)
fikt
, and
(
V ERT
TOT
)
fikt
ratios for each
affiliate f in host country i and sector k at time t. Using these shares as the outcome variables instead, we
re-estimate equations (5.1)-(5.3), reporting these results in Table 3. Since we are no longer interested in
economy-wide aggregates, we now use the affiliate-level records for all 21 years in the 1989-2009 sample.
As a result, the sample size in the regression increases from 15,028 in Table 2 to 211,829.
Consistent with Proposition 1, we find that financial development in the host country strongly in-
fluences the operations of multinational affiliates. Subsidiaries based in countries with better financial
institutions sell a significantly lower share of their output to local consumers. On the other hand, they
24Note that we do not restrict βHORI , βV ERT and βPLAT to sum to 1, since we do not impose that the control variables
enter with the same coefficients across the three regressions.
25However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that βV ERT = βPLAT when formally comparing the magnitudes of these
coefficients.
26The analogous exercise for the stock market capitalization measure of financial development yields a reduction in the
horizontal sales share of 0.051× (1.06− 0.08) = 0.050, and increases in the third-country and U.S. sales shares of 0.025 and
0.015 respectively.
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re-export a higher fraction of their sales to third-country markets and back to the U.S. In line with
Lemma 3, vertical FDI responds less to credit conditions in the host country than platform FDI. The
patterns seen here with the affiliate-level regressions thus continue to be similar to those in Table 2,
albeit being slightly smaller in magnitude. That said, the point estimates continue to corroborate the
βHORI < 0 < βV ERT < βPLAT prediction from our model.
Our baseline results in Tables 2 and 3 obtain in the presence of a large vector of controls, Xit, for
known determinants of multinational activity. First, we have included the host country’s log real GDP as
an explanatory variable in all our regressions. Not surprisingly, we find here that bigger host economies
capture a larger share of the sales of MNC affiliates. We interpret this as a market size effect that raises
the propensity toward horizontal FDI, while steering affiliates away from servicing third-country markets
or the home economy (the U.S.).
Second, we have sought to account for the variation in factor costs across FDI host countries through
the use of three proxies, namely: the stock of physical capital per worker, the stock of human capital
per worker, and real GDP per capita. While high manufacturing costs in the host country may deter
multinational activity in general, it is less clear-cut from a theoretical perspective what effects this has on
the destination mix of affiliate sales. Empirically, we obtain no significant coefficients on these variables
in our baseline regressions in Tables 2 and 3. Nevertheless, controlling for income per capita in particular
remains useful, since it ensures that we estimate the impact of financial development separately from
that of overall economic development.
Third, we have controlled for various measures of trade and FDI costs. The findings here indicate that
distance to the U.S. and the local corporate tax rates faced by U.S. affiliates tend not to be significant
determinants of the destination sales shares. Separately, we have also examined the role of membership
in trade agreements. Countries providing preferential access to nearby markets are likely to be more
attractive export platform locations. We have therefore included a set of dummy variables corresponding
to several large multilateral agreements, including the GATT/WTO and the European Union (EU) in our
regressions. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) signed with the U.S. may similarly affect the production
decisions of U.S. multinationals by lowering trade barriers between home and host countries. For this
reason, we also include variables capturing whether the host country was an RTA partner of the U.S.
While we do not report the full list of trade agreement coefficients, these generally conform to expected
patterns. For example, we find a positive and significant effect of EU membership on the export-platform
share of affiliate sales, with a consequent decrease in the share of both horizontal and vertical sales. In
addition, affiliates located in North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) member countries report
a significantly higher share of return sales to the U.S.
Finally, we have used overall rule of law to capture host country conditions that could affect the
security of MNCs’ inward foreign direct investment. Environments with unstable legal practices cast
doubt on the reliability of property rights protection, reducing firms’ incentives to undertake all three
21
forms of investment. Conditional on producing in a given country, however, multinationals may be
more likely to divert sales to other countries if expropriation risk primarily concerns final goods aimed
for distribution within the local consumer market. This suggests that rule of law may be positively
correlated with the share of horizontal sales, but negatively correlated with the shares of vertical and
platform sales. Where significant, our point estimates broadly suggest that this is indeed the case.
To summarize, our baseline results indicate that host country financial development is an important
determinant of the nature of MNC activity. It influences in particular the spatial distribution of affiliate
sales in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model. These effects are robust to controlling
for an extensive set of alternative factors known to influence multinational activity, mitigating concerns
about omitted variable bias.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We next establish that our findings survive a series of sensitivity analyses. To exploit the richness of the
data and to economize on space, we report all tests at the affiliate level using the full unbalanced panel
for 1989-2009; the results based on the aggregate sales share are largely consistent and we discuss these
only in passing.
We first consider alternative measures of horizontal, vertical, and platform FDI sales that draw on
the distinction between sales to affiliated and unaffiliated customers. Since sales from one MNC affiliate
to another affiliate of the same company represent transactions within the boundaries of the firm, we
use sales to affiliated entities in the U.S. as a narrower measure of vertical FDI. This may implicitly
capture fragmentation of the production process within the firm aimed, for example, at exploiting factor
price differences across countries. On the other hand, sales to unrelated parties in the host country
and in third destinations serve as alternative proxies for horizontal and platform sales, respectively. By
excluding intra-firm transactions, these variables may more precisely capture sales to final consumers
in these markets. Table 4 reports our findings from using these alternative measures of the relative
importance of the different modes of FDI. We obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results,
with the exception of one coefficient (βPLAT in Column 2) that is now only significant at the 15% level of
confidence. Even stronger results hold when we aggregate the data across affiliates to the host country
level (available on request).
We next explore the sensitivity of our results to the choice of estimation technique. In Table 5, we
address the concern that many affiliates report no activity in one of the three FDI categories. Out of
the 211,829 affiliate-country-year observations in the sample, the share of horizontal, vertical, and export
platform sales is 0 in 22,321, 147,041, and 114,997 cases respectively. We therefore check that our findings
hold when we relax the linearity assumption of OLS and instead use Tobit. The point estimates remain
of the same sign, magnitude and significance for all but one coefficient (βPLAT in Column 2), which is
less precisely pinned down. On the other hand, when using the aggregate sales shares, all point estimates
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remain highly statistically significant (available on request).
A potentially important category of omitted variables pertains to unobserved parent firm characteris-
tics. Through the lens of our model, this heterogeneity arises solely from differences in firm productivity
(the 1/a draws). In reality, multinationals might further differ along other dimensions (such as manage-
rial practices, labor skill composition, R&D intensity, financial health) that could affect their production
and sales decisions. Such omitted firm characteristics could also shape the composition of FDI; for in-
stance, firms that enjoy particular familiarity with or product appeal in specific markets could well tilt
their sales toward these destinations.
In Table 6, we therefore control for such unobserved firm characteristics with parent fixed effects. Note
that the role of financial development is now identified primarily from the variation in credit conditions
across the affiliates of the same multinational that are based in different countries. We therefore restrict
the sample to U.S. multinationals with production facilities in at least two countries. (The median MNC
operated in 12 host countries in 1989 and 14 in 2009.) Combined with the fact that we condition on a
wide range of country-level variables, this reduces somewhat the relevant variation in the data underlying
our estimates of βHORI , βPLAT and βV ERT . Even in this stringent specification, we continue to obtain
coefficients that line up as our theory would predict (i.e., βHORI < 0 < βV ERT < βPLAT ). While these
results appear stronger when using stock market capitalization as our measure of financial development,
the relevant coefficients remain significant for private credit as well, except for βV ERT which is marginally
insignificant at the 10% level. In other words, the evidence suggests that when multinationals optimize
their production and sales operations, their affiliates in more financially advanced economies are oriented
more toward vertical and export-platform motives. By contrast, affiliates in less financially developed
host countries tend to divert a greater share of sales to the local market.
While reverse causality is often a challenge in empirical studies of the impact of financial development,
this is arguably less of a concern in our context. It is less clear how the composition of FDI activity (the
respective destination sales shares) would affect the level of private credit or stock market capitalization,
even if it were the case that financial markets responded to the aggregate level of MNC sales. Moreover,
financial development is more plausibly exogenous from the perspective of individual firms, making our
affiliate-level findings less exposed to such endogeneity concerns.
We nevertheless explore the variation in financial dependence across sectors to help establish a clearer
case for a causal effect from credit conditions to MNC operations. The premise of this strategy is
the idea that some industries tend to be more dependent on external sources of financing for largely
technological reasons related to the nature of their manufacturing processes. For example, such industries
may feature substantially higher upfront costs, which impose liquidity constraints on firms with limited
cash flow, raising their need for external capital. Host country financial development should thus be
expected to stimulate relatively more local firm entry and expansion in sectors that are financially more
dependent. Since this would increase competition differentially across industries, we would expect our
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model’s predictions to be more salient in sectors with a high reliance on outside finance.
Table 7 confirms that this is indeed the case. We now include FinDevtit and its interaction with
a measure of industry k’s external capital dependence, this being the commonly-used measure of the
share of capital expenditures not financed from internal cash flow developed by Rajan and Zingales
(1998).27 (Note that the main effect of financial dependence is subsumed by the sector fixed effects in the
regressions.) Reassuringly, we find that the main effect of FinDevtit and its interaction with external
finance dependence both enter with the same sign in each column, implying that the effect of financial
development is reinforced in sectors that are particularly reliant on external sources of capital. The
latter interaction effect is moreover statistically significant in all but one specification (βV ERT in Column
6).28 In other words, in financially developed host countries, U.S. multinationals pursue relatively less
horizontal FDI in sectors that are more financially dependent. Appendix Table 2 shows that similar
results obtain when we repeat this interaction analysis using the data on aggregate sales shares instead.
Finally, we examine the extent to which the above relationships between local financial development
and MNC activity are also manifest in the within-country time series variation. Conceptually, our model
should have implications for both the cross-country and within-country dimensions of the data: At any
given point, countries with weaker financial systems should attract relatively more local affiliate sales
and exhibit relatively lower shares of shipments to third-country destinations or to the U.S. Analogously,
as a country undergoes financial development over time, one should see a weakening of horizontal sales
motives in favor of vertical and export-platform activity. Our empirical approach so far has used the
combined variation in FinDevtit across host countries and over time to estimate βHORI , βV ERT , and
βPLAT , although the presence of year fixed effects limits the role played here by the time-series variation.
We explore the relative importance of the cross- versus within-country variation for FDI patterns as
follows. In unreported regressions, we have verified that our baseline results in Tables 2 and 3 hold in
the pure cross-sections of data in each of the benchmark years. On the other hand, including country
fixed effects in (5.1)-(5.3) without the time dummies often leads to insignificant point estimates, although
the key coefficients of FinDevtit often retain their sign (also available on request). This suggests that
the cross-country variation in financial development is particularly important for picking up the effects
of MNC sales activity that we have documented. This should not be too surprising, given the much
larger variance in FinDevtit across countries, compared to the typical within-country experience, that
we reported earlier. Notwithstanding this, when we further consider differences across sectors in their
inherent dependence on external finance – using the interaction between FinDevtit and the industry
measure of financial dependence – we recover the differential effect of financial development on MNC
27We computed this as an industry median value, using all publicly listed U.S. firms in the Compustat dataset between
1996-2005.
28That said, the magnitudes of the effects here are fairly moderate. The decrease in the horizontal sales share between
a country at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the private credit to GDP ratio for an industry at the 10th relative to 90th
percentiles of external capital dependence stands at: 0.010×(1.05−0.11)×(0.496−(−1.019)) = 0.014, based on the Column
1 estimates in Table 7.
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activity, even if we control additionally for country fixed effects (together with sector and year dummies).
These results are reported in Table 8 for the affiliate-level sales patterns, and in Appendix Table 3 using
the aggregate sales shares. Together, these findings imply that credit market imperfections strongly
predict the pattern of multinational activity across countries and sectors, as well as across sectors within
a country over time. Improvements in credit conditions thus appear to trigger reallocations in the
composition of affiliate sales across industries.
5.3 Underlying Mechanism
The results above suggest that host country financial development shapes the spatial dimension of affiliate
sales in a manner consistent with our theoretical predictions. We conclude with some corroborating
evidence that the mechanism driving these effects works through the entry of more potential competitors
in the local market.
Our model implies that stronger financial markets allow more domestic firms to operate in the South.
In Table 9, we confirm that this is indeed borne out in the data: Countries with higher levels of private
credit access or stock market capitalization support a significantly larger number of local establishments
(Columns 1 and 5). We measure the latter with the log number of establishments by country as reported
in the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database. In these regressions, we have included the full set of control
variables, Xit, and year fixed effects, in order to highlight the independent role of country financial
development in influencing the thickness of domestic markets on the production side. Several caveats
related to the UNIDO data are in order, chief among which is the fact that the underlying coverage is
inherently uneven across countries and over time, resulting in an unbalanced panel. We are also unable
to distinguish between establishments that are purely domestic and those that may have a foreign parent.
That said, the UNIDO data do represent the best available information to our knowledge on industrial
activity around the world, which is why we exploit them for this exercise.
To test the mechanism proposed in our model, we obtained the fitted value for the number of es-
tablishments in each country from these “first-stage” regressions. This provides us with a proxy for the
extent of competition that MNC affiliates may encounter in these production locations, as predicted by
the the local credit environment (among other variables). In the rest of Table 9, we then re-ran the
specifications in (5.1)-(5.3), but replacing FinDevtit with the predicted number of establishments from
this “first-stage”. We indeed find that MNC affiliates keep a smaller fraction of their sales in their host
country when more establishments are present there. In such circumstances, affiliates instead direct more
of their sales back home to the U.S. or to other markets. Once again, exports to third-country destina-
tions respond more than return shipments to the U.S. While these findings for the local and platform
sales shares are statistically significant at the 1% level when we use private credit to predict the number
of establishments, a similar but less precise pattern obtains when we employ stock market capitalization
instead. These findings help to strengthen the link between our theory and the empirics, by lending
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credence to our interpretation of a competition effect through which host country financial development
affects MNC activity.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature examining how conditions in FDI host countries affect the
structure of multinational activity. We uncover several novel effects of financial development in the FDI-
receiving country, using comprehensive data on U.S. multinational activity abroad. In host countries
where secure sources of external credit are more accessible, MNC affiliates exhibit a lower share of sales
to the local market, while channelling a larger share toward sales to third-country markets. There is a
further positive effect on the share of return sales to the U.S. (the home market), but this tends to be
smaller in magnitude than the corresponding effect of export platform sales. Better host country financial
development thus appears to reduce the horizontal component of FDI, while raising the export-platform
motive for multinational activity.
We posit and formalize a competition effect to explain this link between financial development and the
spatial distribution of MNC sales. An improvement in credit conditions in the FDI host country (“South”)
would facilitate the entry of more Southern manufacturing firms into the local market. Northern varieties
thus face more competition in the Southern market, and this prompts Northern MNCs based in South
to shift their sales away from the local market, toward the third-country and home country markets
instead. In support of this mechanism, we presented evidence that the effect of host country financial
development on the spatial composition of affiliate sales operates at least in part through the former’s
effect on the entry of establishments in the local economy.
There remains much scope for further research on this topic. While we have focused in this paper on
the effects of local credit conditions on MNC activity, there is clearly room to improve our understanding
of how MNC affiliates and domestic firms interact in the host country’s financial market. Our findings
also shed light on one possible mechanism through which local conditions might affect the nature of
global supply chain activity, an issue that certainly deserves more attention and investigation.
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8 Appendix (Details of Proofs)
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Log-differentiating (2.15) and (2.17), one obtains:
(ε− 1)daS
aS
=
dη
η
+
dAss
Ass
, and
aε−1S Vs(aS)
dAss
Ass
+ [aε−1S V
′
s (aS)− ηG′s(aS)]daS = 0.
Note that we have used the fact that (1−α)Ass(ω/α)1−ε = (1/η)aε−1S RfSω, which holds from the cutoff
expression for a1−εS from (2.15), in deriving the second equation above. Solving these two equations
simultaneously yields:
daS
dη
=
1
η
aε−1S Vs(aS)
(ε− 1)aε−2S Vs(aS) + [aε−1S V ′s (aS)− ηG′s(aS)]
> 0, and
dAss
dη
= −Ass
η
aε−1S V
′
s (aS)− ηG′s(aS)
(ε− 1)aε−2S Vs(aS) + [aε−1S V ′s (aS)− ηG′s(aS)]
< 0.
To sign these last two expressions, observe that applying Liebnitz’s rule to the definition of Vs(aS)
implies that aε−1S V
′
s (aS) = G
′
s(aS). Hence, a
ε−1
S V
′
s (aS) − ηG′s(aS) = (1 − η)G′s(aS) > 0, since η ∈ (0, 1)
and G′s(a) > 0 for all a ∈ (0, a¯s). (Bear in mind also that ε > 1.)
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof of this lemma is long, so it is useful to provide a heuristic roadmap of how it proceeds.
We will take the remaining 13 equations that define the Western industry equilibrium – (2.3)-(2.6),
(2.11)-(2.14), (2.16), and (2.18)-(2.21) – and log-differentiate them. We then reduce the resulting system
to a set of 4 equations in the 4 unknowns, daDaD ,
daXN
aXN
, daXSaXS , and
daI
aI
. From this, we can determine the
comparative statics with respect to η for the Western industry cutoffs, and hence for the other endogenous
variables as well.
First, log-differentiating (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) yields:
(ε− 1)daD
aD
=
dAww
Aww
, (8.1)
(ε− 1)daXN
aXN
=
dAew
Aew
, and (8.2)
(ε− 1)daXS
aXS
=
dAsw
Asw
. (8.3)
Since ε > 1, this implies that: sign(daDdη ) = sign(
dAww
dη ), sign(
daXN
dη ) = sign(
dAew
dη ), and sign(
daXS
dη ) =
sign(dAswdη ).
Similarly, log-differentiating (2.14) yields:
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(ε− 1)daI
aI
=
Aww
((
τω
α
)1−ε − ( 1
α
)1−ε) dAww
Aww
+Aew
((
τω
α
)1−ε − ( τ
α
)1−ε) dAew
Aew
+Asw
((
ω
α
)1−ε − ( τ
α
)1−ε) dAsw
Asw
Aww
((
τω
α
)1−ε − ( 1
α
)1−ε)
+Aew
((
τω
α
)1−ε − ( τ
α
)1−ε)
+Asw
((
ω
α
)1−ε − ( τ
α
)1−ε) .
We replace dAwwAww ,
dAew
Aew
, and dAswAsw by the expressions in (8.1)-(8.3). Making use also of the expressions:
(i) for Aww, Aew and Asw from (2.3)-(2.5); and (ii) for P
1−ε
ww , P
1−ε
ew and P
1−ε
sw from (2.18)-(2.20); and
simplifying extensively, one can show that:
daI
aI
=
ρ1(1−∆1)daDaD + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2)
daXN
aXN
+ 1−ρ22
Es
En
(1−∆3)daXSaXS
ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2) + 1−ρ22 EsEn (1−∆3)
, (8.4)
where we define:
ρ1 =
P 1−φww
P 1−φww + P 1−φew
, (8.5)
ρ2 =
P 1−φss
P 1−φss + 2P 1−φsw
, (8.6)
∆1 =
(
1
α
)1−ε
Vn(aD)(
1
α
)1−ε
Vn(aD) + (
(
τω
α
)1−ε − ( 1α)1−ε)Vn(aI) , (8.7)
∆2 =
(
τ
α
)1−ε
Vn(aXN )(
τ
α
)1−ε
Vn(aXN ) + (
(
τω
α
)1−ε − ( τα)1−ε)Vn(aI) , and (8.8)
∆3 =
(
τ
α
)1−ε
Vn(aXS)(
τ
α
)1−ε
Vn(aXS) + (
(
ω
α
)1−ε − ( τα)1−ε)Vn(aI) . (8.9)
Thus, daIaI is a weighted average of
daD
aD
, daXNaXN , and
daXS
aXS
. Note that: ρ1, ρ2,∆1,∆2,∆3 ∈ (0, 1). Moreover,
using the definitions of ∆1, ∆2, and ∆3, we have:
sign{∆1 −∆2} = sign{(ω1−ε − 1)VN (aD)− ((τω)1−ε − 1)VN (aXN )} > 0.
This inequality holds as: VN (aD) > VN (aXN ) > 0 (since aD > aXN ), and ω
1−ε − 1 > (τω)1−ε − 1 > 0.
In an analogous fashion, we have:
sign{∆2 −∆3} = sign{(ω1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aXN )− ((τω)1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aXS)} > 0.
This is again positive since: VN (aXN ) > VN (aXS) > 0 (because aXN > aXS), and ω
1−ε − τ1−ε >
(τω)1−ε − τ1−ε > 0. It therefore follows that 1 > ∆1 > ∆2 > ∆3 > 0. These are useful properties to
bear in mind for what follows.
We now differentiate the free-entry condition for West, (2.16):
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0 =
[
(1− α)Aww
((
1
α
)1−ε
Vn(aD) +
((τω
α
)1−ε
−
(
1
α
)1−ε)
Vn(aI)
)]
dAww
Aww
. . .+
[
(1− α)Aew
(( τ
α
)1−ε
Vn(aXN ) +
((τω
α
)1−ε
−
( τ
α
)1−ε)
Vn(aI)
)]
dAew
Aew
. . .+
[
(1− α)Asw
(( τ
α
)1−ε
Vn(aXS) +
((ω
α
)1−ε
−
( τ
α
)1−ε)
Vn(aI)
)]
dAsw
Asw
. . .+
[
(1− α)Aww
(
1
α
)1−ε
V ′n(aD)−RfDG′n(aD)
]
daD
. . .+
[
(1− α)Aew
( τ
α
)1−ε
V ′n(aXN )−RfXG′n(aXN )
]
daXN
. . .+
[
(1− α)Asw
( τ
α
)1−ε
V ′n(aXS)−RfXG′n(aXS)
]
daXS
. . .+
[
(1− α)
(
Aww
((τω
α
)1−ε
−
(
1
α
)1−ε)
+Aew
((τω
α
)1−ε
−
( τ
α
)1−ε)
. . .+Asw
((ω
α
)1−ε
−
( τ
α
)1−ε))
V ′n(aI)−R(fI − fD)G′n(aI)
]
daI .
Focus first on the term involving daD on the right-hand side. We make use of the fact that: (i) (1 −
α)Aww(1/α)
1−ε = aε−1D RfD, which holds from the expression for a
1−ε
D from (2.11); and (ii) a
ε−1V ′n(a) =
G′n(a) for all a ∈ (0, a¯n), which holds from Leibnitz’s Rule; one can show that the coefficient of daD
reduces to 0. An analogous argument implies that the coefficients of daXN , daXS , and daI are all also
equal to 0. Turning to the terms involving dAwwAww ,
dAew
Aew
, and dAswAsw , one can now apply the definitions in
(8.5)-(8.6) to simplify the derivative of this free-entry equation to:
ρ1
dAww
Aww
+ (1− ρ1)dAew
Aew
+
1− ρ2
2
Es
En
dAsw
Asw
= 0.
A quick substitution from (8.1)-(8.3) then implies:
ρ1
daD
aD
+ (1− ρ1)daXN
aXN
+
1− ρ2
2
Es
En
daXS
aXS
= 0. (8.10)
Intuitively, the free-entry condition requires that a rise in demand in any one market for the Western
firm’s goods must be balanced by a decline in demand from at least one other market. By implication,
the three s aD, aXN and aXS cannot all move in the same direction.
We move on to log-differentiate the market demand expressions in (2.3)-(2.6):
dAww
Aww
=
(
(1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1 − 1
)
dP 1−εww
P 1−εww
− (1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1
dP 1−εew
P 1−εew
, (8.11)
dAew
Aew
=
(
ρ1
φ− 1
ε− 1 − 1
)
dP 1−εew
P 1−εew
− ρ1φ− 1
ε− 1
dP 1−εww
P 1−εww
, (8.12)
dAsw
Asw
=
(
ρ2
φ− 1
ε− 1 − 1
)
dP 1−εsw
P 1−εsw
− ρ2φ− 1
ε− 1
dP 1−εss
P 1−εss
, and (8.13)
dAss
Ass
=
(
(1− ρ2)φ− 1
ε− 1 − 1
)
dP 1−εss
P 1−εss
− (1− ρ2)φ− 1
ε− 1
dP 1−εsw
P 1−εsw
. (8.14)
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Meanwhile, log-differentiating the ideal price indices (2.18)-(2.20) gives us:
dP 1−εww
P 1−εww
=
dNn
Nn
+ (k − ε+ 1)
(
∆1
daD
aD
+ (1−∆1)daI
aI
)
, (8.15)
dP 1−εew
P 1−εew
=
dNn
Nn
+ (k − ε+ 1)
(
∆2
daXN
aXN
+ (1−∆2)daI
aI
)
, and (8.16)
dP 1−εsw
P 1−εsw
=
dNn
Nn
+ (k − ε+ 1)
(
∆3
daXS
aXS
+ (1−∆3)daI
aI
)
, (8.17)
where we have applied the fact that: aV
′
n(a)
Vn(a)
= k − ε+ 1, for the Pareto distribution to obtain these last
three equations.29
Using Cramer’s Rule, we now invert (8.13) and (8.14) to obtain:
dP 1−εsw
P 1−εsw
=
(
−ρ2φ− 1
ε− φ − 1
)
dAsw
Asw
+ ρ2
φ− 1
ε− φ
dAss
Ass
, and (8.18)
dP 1−εss
P 1−εss
=
(
−(1− ρ2)φ− 1
ε− φ − 1
)
dAss
Ass
+ (1− ρ2)φ− 1
ε− φ
dAsw
Asw
. (8.19)
Setting (8.17) equal to (8.18) then implies that:
dNn
Nn
= ρ2
φ− 1
ε− φ
dAss
Ass
−
[
(ε− 1)
(
ρ2
φ− 1
ε− φ + 1
)
+ (k − ε+ 1)∆3
]
daXS
aXS
− (k − ε+ 1)(1−∆3)daI
aI
. (8.20)
We now plug this expression for dNnNn into (8.15) and (8.16), and substitute the subsequent expressions
for dP
1−ε
ww
P 1−εww
and dP
1−ε
ew
P 1−εew
into (8.11) and (8.12). Finally, replacing dAwwAww and
dAew
Aew
with the expressions in
terms of daDaD and
daXN
aXN
from (8.1) and (8.2) respectively, one obtains (after some rearrangement):
ρ2
k − ε+ 1
φ− 1
ε− φ
dAss
Ass
=
[(
(1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1 − 1
)
∆1 − ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
]
daD
aD
− (1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1 ∆2
daXN
aXN
. . .+
[
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
(
ρ2
φ− 1
ε− φ + 1
)
+ ∆3
]
daXS
aXS
. . .+
[
(∆1 −∆3)− (∆1 −∆2)(1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1
]
daI
aI
, and (8.21)
ρ2
k − ε+ 1
φ− 1
ε− φ
dAss
Ass
= −ρ1 φ− 1
ε− 1 ∆1
daD
aD
+
[(
ρ1
φ− 1
ε− 1 − 1
)
∆2 − ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
]
daXN
aXN
. . .+
[
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
(
ρ2
φ− 1
ε− φ + 1
)
+ ∆3
]
daXS
aXS
. . .+
[
(∆2 −∆3) + (∆1 −∆2)ρ1 φ− 1
ε− 1
]
daI
aI
. (8.22)
(8.4), (8.10), (8.21), and (8.22) give us four equations in the four unknowns, daDaD ,
daXN
aXN
, daXSaXS , and
daI
aI
. To pin down the comparative statics explicitly, note that equating (8.22) and (8.21) implies:
daI
aI
=
1
∆1 −∆2
[(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
daD
dD
−
(
∆2 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
daXN
dXN
]
. (8.23)
29This is the key step where the Pareto distribution assumption leads to some helpful simplifications in the algebra. Note
that most of our results would also hold if we were willing to make the more general assumption that aV ′n(a)/Vn(a) is (weakly)
increasing in a for all a ∈ (0, a¯n); details are available on request. Note also that we have not explicitly differentiated (2.21)
for P 1−εss . This equation only plays a role in pinning down the sign of
dNs
Ns
, which is of secondary interest to our exercise.
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Meanwhile, using (8.10) to eliminate daXSaXS from (8.4) delivers:
daI
aI
= − ρ1(∆1 −∆3)
daD
aD
+ (1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3)daXNaXN
ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2) + 1−ρ22 EsEn (1−∆3)
. (8.24)
For convenience, let us define: ∆d = ρ1(1 − ∆1) + (1 − ρ1)(1 − ∆2) + 1−ρ22 EsEn (1 − ∆3), which is the
denominator in (8.24). Note that ∆d > 0, since ρ1, ρ2,∆1,∆2,∆3 ∈ (0, 1).
Then, setting (8.23) equal to (8.24) and rearranging, one obtains:
0 =
[
ρ1(∆1 −∆3)(∆1 −∆2) + ∆d
(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)]
daD
aD
. . .+
[
(1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3)(∆1 −∆2)−∆d
(
∆2 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)]
daXN
aXN
. (8.25)
Since ∆1 −∆2,∆1 −∆3 > 0, it follows that the coefficient of daDaD in (8.25) is positive. Moreover, using
the definition of ∆d, one can see that the coefficient of
daXN
aXN
is strictly smaller than: (1 − ρ1)(∆2 −
∆3)(∆1 −∆2)− (1− ρ1)(1−∆2)∆2, which itself is already negative, since: 1−∆2 > ∆1 −∆2 > 0, and
∆2 > ∆2 −∆3 > 0. Thus, the coefficient of daXNaXN in (8.25) is negative. Since the linear combination in
(8.25) is equal to 0, it follows that sign(daDdη ) = sign(
daXN
dη ).
We require one more equation in daDaD and
daXN
aXN
in order to pin down their common sign. For this,
substitute the expression for daIaI from (8.24) and that for
daXS
aXS
from (8.10) into (8.21) to obtain:
ρ2
k − ε+ 1
φ− 1
ε− φ
dAss
Ass
=
[(
(1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1 − 1
)
∆1 − 2ρ1
1− ρ2
En
Es
(
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
(
ρ2
φ− 1
ε− φ + 1
)
+ ∆3
)
. . . − ε− 1
k − ε+ 1 −
(
(∆1 −∆3)− (∆1 −∆2)(1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1
)
ρ1(∆1 −∆3)
∆d
]
daD
aD
. . .+
[
−(1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1 ∆2 −
2(1− ρ1)
1− ρ2
En
Es
(
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
(
ρ2
φ− 1
ε− φ + 1
)
+ ∆3
)
. . . −
(
(∆1 −∆3)− (∆1 −∆2)(1− ρ1)φ− 1
ε− 1
)
(1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3)
∆d
]
daXN
aXN
. (8.26)
Note that (∆1 −∆3)− (∆1 −∆2)(1− ρ1)φ−1ε−1 > 0, since: ∆1 −∆3 > ∆1 −∆2 > 0, 1 − ρ1 ∈ (0, 1), and
φ−1
ε−1 ∈ (0, 1) (because ε > φ > 1). These conditions also imply that: (1 − ρ1)φ−1ε−1 − 1 < 0. It is then
straightforward to see that the coefficients of both daDaD and
daXN
aXN
in (8.26) are negative. From Lemma
1, recall that dAssdη < 0. It follows then from (8.26) that sign(
daD
dη ) = sign(
daXN
dη ) > 0.
Rearranging (8.25) now implies that:
1
aD
daD
dη
1
aXN
daXN
dη
=
−(1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3)(∆1 −∆2) + ∆d
(
∆2 +
ε−1
k−ε+1
ε−1
ε−φ
)
ρ1(∆1 −∆3)(∆1 −∆2) + ∆d
(
∆1 +
ε−1
k−ε+1
ε−1
ε−φ
) . (8.27)
It is easy to verify that the numerator of (8.27) is positive but smaller than the denominator; in particular,
this follows as a consequence of ∆1 > ∆2. It follows that
1
aD
daD
dη /
1
aXN
daXN
dη ∈ (0, 1), so that: 1aXN
daXN
dη >
1
aD
daD
dη > 0, as stated in part (i) of Lemma 2. Part (iii) of the lemma then holds immediately from (8.1)
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and (8.2), since the percentage changes in aD and aXN are respectively proportional to the percentage
changes in Aww and Aew (by a multiplicative factor equal to ε− 1 > 0).
As for part (ii) of the lemma, observe that (8.10) implies:
daXS
aXS
= − 2
1− ρ2
En
Es
(
ρ1
daD
aD
+ (1− ρ1)daXN
aXN
)
< 0. (8.28)
At the same time, it is clear from (8.24) that daIaI < 0. Now, subtracting (8.28) from (8.24) yields:
daI
aI
− daXS
aXS
=
(
−∆1 −∆3
∆d
+
2
1− ρ2
En
Es
)
ρ1
daD
aD
+
(
−∆2 −∆3
∆d
+
2
1− ρ2
En
Es
)
(1− ρ1)daXN
aXN
.
One can check directly that: 21−ρ2
En
Es
∆d > 1−∆3 > ∆1−∆3,∆2−∆3. The coefficients of daDaD and
daXN
aXN
from this last equation are thus both positive, from which we can conclude that: 1aXS
daXS
dη <
1
aI
daI
dη < 0.
Finally, part (iv) follows from the fact that daXSaXS and
dAsw
Asw
share the same sign (from (8.3)).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For a given level of firm productivity 1/a, the definitions of HORI(a), PLAT (a), and V ERT (a)
imply that the effects of Southern financial development on these sales volumes are pinned down re-
spectively by the derivative of Asw, Aew, and Aww with respect to η. Lemma 2 then implies that when
Southern financial development improves, HORI(a) falls (since dAswdη < 0), PLAT (a) increases (since
dAew
dη > 0), and V ERT (a) increases (since
dAww
dη > 0).
Moreover, from (3.3), one can see that ddη
HORI(a)
TOT (a) < 0, since both
Aww
Asw
and AewAsw increase with η. On
the other hand, from (3.4), we have ddη
PLAT (a)
TOT (a) > 0, since both
Asw
Aew
and AwwAew are decreasing in η. (That
d
dη
Aww
Aew
< 0 follows from 1Aew
dAew
dη >
1
Aww
dAww
dη > 0.)
It remains to show that ddη
V ERT (a)
TOT (a) > 0 as well. From (3.5), it suffices to show that τ
ε−1 Asw
Aww
+ AewAww
decreases with η. Note that:
d
dη
(
τε−1
Asw
Aww
+
Aew
Aww
)
∝ τε−1Asw
(
1
Asw
dAsw
dη
− 1
Aww
dAww
dη
)
+Aew
(
1
Aew
dAew
dη
− 1
Aww
dAww
dη
)
∝ τε−1Asw
Aew
(
1
aXS
daXS
dη
− 1
aD
daD
dη
)
+
(
1
aXN
daXN
dη
− 1
aD
daD
dη
)
,
where ‘∝’ denotes equality up to a positive multiplicative term. (In the last step above, we have used
(8.1)-(8.3) to replace the derivatives of the aggregate demand levels with the derivatives of the industry
cutoffs.) We now replace daXSdη using the expression in (8.28). Also, based on the definitions from (2.4),
(2.3), (8.5) and (8.6), one can show that: AswAew =
Es
En
1−ρ2
2(1−ρ1)
P 1−εew
P 1−εsw
. Performing these substitutions and
rearranging, one obtains:
d
dη
(
τε−1
Asw
Aww
+
Aew
Aww
)
∝ −
[
1 + τε−1
Asw
Aew
(
En
Es
2ρ1
1− ρ2 + 1
)]
1
aD
daD
dη
+
. . .+
[
1− τε−1P
1−ε
ew
P 1−εsw
]
1
aXN
daXN
dη
. (8.29)
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In this last equation, the coefficient of 1aD
daD
dη is clearly negative. As for the coefficient of
1
aXN
daXN
dη , using
the expressions for P 1−εew and P 1−εsw from (2.19) and (2.20), we have:
1− τ ε−1P
1−ε
ew
P 1−εsw
= 1− τ ε−1
[
τ1−εVN (aXN ) + ((τω)1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aI)
τ1−εVN (aXS) + (ω1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aI)
]
=
τ1−ε(VN (aXS)− VN (aI))− (VN (aXN )− VN (aI))
τ1−εVN (aXS) + (ω1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aI)
<
(τ1−ε − 1)(VN (aXN )− VN (aI))
τ1−εVN (aXS) + (ω1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aI)
< 0.
The second-to-last step relies on the fact that VN (aXN ) > VN (aXS) (since aXN > aXS), while the last
step follows from τ1−ε < 1 and VN (aXN ) > VN (aI) (since aXN > aI). The coefficient of 1aXN
daXN
dη is
thus negative as well. Since daDdη ,
daXN
dη > 0, it follows from (8.29) that
d
dη
(
τ ε−1 AswAww +
Aew
Aww
)
< 0. Hence,
V ERT (a)
TOT (a) increases with η.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For part (i) of the lemma, based on the definitions of PLAT (a) and V ERT (a), we have:
d
dη
(PLAT (a)− V ERT (a)) = (1− α)
(τaω
α
)1−ε
Aww
(
Aew
Aww
1
Aew
dAew
dη
− 1
Aww
dAww
dη
)
.
We show first that AewAww > 1. From the definitions of Aww and Aew in (2.3) and (2.4), we have:
Aew
Aww
=
[
VN (aD) + ((τω)
1−ε − 1)VN (aI)
τ1−εVN (aXN ) + ((τω)1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aI)
] ε−φ
ε−1
. (8.30)
Observe now that:
VN (aD) + ((τω)
1−ε − 1)VN (aI)−
(
τ1−εVN (aXN ) + ((τω)1−ε − τ1−ε)VN (aI)
)
= VN (aD)− VN (aI)− τ1−ε(VN (aXN )− VN (aI))
> (1− τ1−ε)(VN (aXN )− VN (aI))
> 0.
Note that the second-to-last step above uses the fact that VN (aD) > VN (aXN ) (since aD > aXN ), while
the final step holds because τ1−ε < 1. Since the exponent, ε−φε−1 , in (8.30) is positive (as ε > φ > 1), it
follows that AewAww > 1, as claimed.
We thus have:
d
dη
(PLAT (a)− V ERT (a)) > (1− α)
(τaω
α
)1−ε
Aww
(
1
Aew
dAew
dη
− 1
Aww
dAww
dη
)
> 0,
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since 1Aew
dAew
dη >
1
Aww
dAww
dη from Lemma 2.
As for part (ii) of the lemma, applying the quotient rule to the expressions for PLAT (a)TOT (a) and
V ERT (a)
TOT (a)
from (3.4) and (3.5) respectively, one obtains after some simplification that:
d
dη
[
PLAT (a)
TOT (a)
− V ERT (a)
TOT (a)
]
∝ τ ε−1Asw
Aew
(
1− Aew
Aww
)
1
Asw
dAsw
dη
+ 2
(
1
Aew
dAew
dη
− 1
Aww
dAww
dη
)
. . .+ τ ε−1
Asw
Aew
(
Aew
Aww
1
Aew
dAew
dη
− 1
Aww
dAww
dη
)
> 0,
where this last inequality hinges on: 1Aew
dAew
dη >
1
Aww
dAww
dη > 0 >
1
Asw
dAsw
dη (from Lemma 2), and
Aew
Aww
> 1
(as shown above for part (i) of this lemma).
8.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. To show that dNndη < 0 for part (i), we solve for
dNn
Nn
from (8.16). First, note that applying
Cramer’s Rule to (8.11) and (8.12), we have:
dP 1−εew
P 1−εew
= ρ1
φ− 1
ε− φ
(
dAww
Aww
− dAew
Aew
)
− dAew
Aew
= (ε− 1)
[
ρ1
φ− 1
ε− φ
(
daD
aD
− daXN
aXN
)
− daXN
aXN
]
. (8.31)
(In particular, this means that 1
P 1−εew
dP 1−εew
dη < 0, since
1
aXN
daXN
dη >
1
aD
daD
dη > 0 by Lemma 2.) Substituting
from (8.31) into (8.16), replacing daIaI with the expression from (8.23), and rearranging yields:
1
k − ε+ 1
dNn
Nn
=
[
ρ1
φ− 1
ε− φ
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1 −
1−∆2
∆1 −∆2
(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)]
daD
aD
. . .+
[
−
(
ρ1
φ− 1
ε− φ + 1
)
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1 −∆2 +
1−∆2
∆1 −∆2
(
∆2 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)]
daXN
aXN
. (8.32)
To determine the sign of dNnNn , divide the right-hand side of (8.32) by
daXN
aXN
, and substitute in the expression
for daDaD /
daXN
dXN
from (8.27). After simplifying and collecting terms, one can show that the sign of dNndη is
given by the sign of:
−
(
∆2 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
)[
∆d
(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
+ ρ1(∆1 −∆2)(∆1 −∆3)
]
. . .− ρ1 ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
φ− 1
ε− φ (∆1 −∆2) [ρ1(∆1 −∆3) + (1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3) + ∆d]
. . .+ (1−∆2)
[(
∆2 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
ρ1(∆1 −∆3) +
(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
(1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3)
]
< −
(
∆2 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
)[
(ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2))
(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
+ ρ1(∆1 −∆2)(∆1 −∆3)
]
. . .− ρ1 ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
φ− 1
ε− φ (∆1 −∆2)(1−∆3)
. . .+ (1−∆2)
[(
∆2 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
ρ1(∆1 −∆3) +
(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
(1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3)
]
, (8.33)
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where the inequality comes from applying: ∆d > ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2).
We now collect all the terms in (8.33) in which ε−1k−ε+1 does not appear. These are:
−∆2 [(ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2))∆1 + ρ1(∆1 −∆2)(∆1 −∆3)]
. . .+ (1−∆2) [∆2ρ1(∆1 −∆3) + ∆1(1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3)]
= −∆3 [ρ1∆2(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)∆1(1−∆2)]
< 0.
This term is negative, since ρ1,∆1,∆2,∆3 ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, we collect the remaining terms in (8.33), all of which involve ε−1k−ε+1 , as follows:
− ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
[
(ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2))
(
∆1 +
ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
ε− 1
ε− φ
)
+ ρ1(∆1 −∆2)(∆1 −∆3)
. . .+ ∆2(ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2)) ε− 1
ε− φ
. . .+ ρ1
φ− 1
ε− φ (∆1 −∆2)(1−∆3)−
ε− 1
ε− φ (1−∆2)(ρ1(∆1 −∆3) + (1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3))
]
< − ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
[
(ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2))∆1 + ρ1(∆1 −∆2)(∆1 −∆3) + φ− 1
ε− φρ1(∆1 −∆2)(1−∆3)
. . .+ ∆2(ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2)) ε− 1
ε− φ −
ε− 1
ε− φ (1−∆2)(ρ1(∆1 −∆3) + (1− ρ1)(∆2 −∆3))
]
= − ε− 1
k − ε+ 1
[
ρ1(1−∆1)∆2 + (1− ρ1)∆1(1−∆2) + ε− 1
ε− φ∆3(ρ1(1−∆1) + (1− ρ1)(1−∆2))
]
< 0,
since ε−1k−ε+1 > 0. This completes the proof that
dNn
dη < 0 for part (i) of the proposition.
For part (ii), since Vn(a) is an increasing function for all a ∈ (0, a¯n), an improvement in η leads to a
decrease in aI and hence in Vn(aI) also. Lemma 4 has also established that Nn decreases in η. Therefore,
to show that HORI, PLAT , and V ERT all decline in η, it suffices to prove that PLAT is declining in
η, since 1Aew
dAew
dη >
1
Aww
dAww
dη ,
1
Asw
dAsw
dη .
From the expression for PLAT in (3.7), we have:
d
dη
ln(PLAT ) =
1
Nn
dNn
dη
+
1
Aew
dAew
dη
+
V ′N (aI)aI
VN (aI)
1
aI
daI
dη
= (ε− 1)
[
ρ1
φ− 1
ε− φ
(
1
aXN
daXN
dη
− 1
aD
daD
dη
)
− 1
aXN
daXN
dη
]
. . .− (k − ε+ 1)
(
∆2
1
aXN
daXN
dη
+ (1−∆2) 1
aI
daI
dη
)
+ (ε− 1) 1
aXN
daXN
dη
+ (k − ε+ 1) 1
aI
daI
dη
= −(ε− 1)ρ1 φ− 1
ε− φ
(
1
aXN
daXN
dη
− 1
aD
daD
dη
)
− (k − ε+ 1)∆2
(
1
aXN
daXN
dη
− 1
aI
daI
dη
)
< 0.
To get from the first line above to the second line, we have used the expression for dNndη from (8.16), and
substituted for dP
1−ε
ew
P 1−εew
using (8.31). We have also used (8.1) and (8.2) to substitute for 1Aww
dAww
dη and
1
Aew
dAew
dη wherever these terms appear. Finally, we have relied on the fact that
V ′N (aI)aI
VN (aI)
= k−ε+1 for the
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Pareto distribution. The last step establishing that ddη ln(PLAT ) < 0 follows from
1
aXN
daXN
dη >
1
aD
daD
dη >
1
aI
daI
dη , bearing in mind that φ− 1 > 0 and k− ε+ 1 > 0. Thus, when η increases, the contraction in the
extensive margin captured by the fall in Nn and VN (aI) is larger in magnitude than the increase in sales
on the intensive margin due to the rise in the demand level, Aew.
30
Turning to part (iii) of the proposition, note from (3.6)-(3.8) that the expressions for the aggregate
horizontal, platform and vertical shares are identical to (3.3)-(3.5), the corresponding expressions for
individual MNCs. From the proof of Proposition 1, this means that HORITOT falls, while both
PLAT
TOT and
V ERT
TOT rise, when η increases.
30Note that these results in part (ii) of the proposition hinge on the use of the Pareto distribution. More generally, we
can always conclude that d
dη
V ERT < 0, since dAsw
dη
< 0 reinforces the decrease in Nn and Vn(aI). However, the signs of
d
dη
PLAT and d
dη
HORI will depend on the specific distributional assumption adopted.
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Mean St Dev
Year: 1989
Number of obs. = 14,042
Local / Total sales 0.771 0.351
3rd country / Total sales 0.156 0.290
US / Total sales 0.072 0.216
Unaffiliated local / Total sales 0.726 0.381
Unaffiliated 3rd country / Total sales 0.098 0.231
Affiliated US / Total sales 0.054 0.187
Year: 2009
Number of obs. = 16,478
Local / Total sales 0.733 0.382
3rd country / Total sales 0.191 0.326
US / Total sales 0.076 0.220
Unaffiliated local / Total sales 0.655 0.420
Unaffiliated 3rd country / Total sales 0.098 0.238
Affiliated US / Total sales 0.055 0.189
Table 1
Notes: Based on the BEA Survey of US Direct Investment Abroad.
Summary Statistics: MNC Sales
(Affiliate-level variables, benchmark survey years)
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.080 0.036 0.025 -0.051 0.026 0.015
(-3.27)*** (1.67)* (3.68)*** (-3.01)*** (2.00)* (2.82)***
Log GDP 0.026 -0.030 -0.008 0.018 -0.026 -0.006
(2.91)*** (-4.52)*** (-2.94)*** (1.95)* (-3.91)*** (-2.63)**
Log GDP per capita -0.006 0.034 -0.005 0.021 0.017 -0.012
(-0.13) (0.93) (-0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (-0.90)
Log Distance -0.022 0.015 -0.000 -0.011 0.009 -0.004
(-1.10) (1.27) (-0.07) (-0.59) (0.78) (-0.75)
Log K per worker -0.011 -0.005 0.009 -0.026 0.003 0.013
(-0.24) (-0.15) (0.81) (-0.54) (0.08) (1.14)
Log H per worker 0.112 -0.024 -0.017 0.083 -0.006 -0.009
(1.44) (-0.39) (-0.78) (1.13) (-0.10) (-0.43)
Rule of Law 0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.000 0.001 -0.002
(0.80) (-0.40) (-1.63) (-0.04) (0.24) (-0.76)
Tax Rate -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.35) (1.27) (0.16) (-1.56) (1.44) (0.64)
Trade Agreements Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 15,028 15,028 15,028 15,028 15,028 15,028
R-squared 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.20 0.23 0.13
Table 2
Host Country Financial Development and the Spatial Distribution of MNC Sales
(Aggregate evidence, benchmark years only)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as a full set of multilateral and regional trade
agreement dummies. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.072 0.033 0.019 -0.039 0.020 0.014
(-3.05)*** (1.84)* (2.09)** (-2.76)*** (2.17)** (3.04)***
Log GDP 0.045 -0.043 -0.009 0.037 -0.039 -0.007
(4.69)*** (-6.03)*** (-2.87)*** (3.53)*** (-5.43)*** (-2.38)**
Log GDP per capita -0.039 0.016 0.023 -0.026 0.007 0.013
(-0.84) (0.43) (1.70)* (-0.52) (0.17) (1.00)
Log Distance -0.017 0.017 0.010 -0.010 0.013 0.007
(-0.98) (1.53) (1.04) (-0.56) (1.07) (0.94)
Log K per worker 0.002 0.006 -0.007 -0.007 0.012 -0.001
(0.05) (0.17) (-0.58) (-0.16) (0.34) (-0.12)
Log H per worker 0.043 0.024 -0.078 0.016 0.040 -0.065
(0.48) (0.38) (-2.29)** (0.18) (0.62) (-1.99)**
Rule of Law 0.021 -0.002 -0.009 0.014 0.001 -0.007
(1.73)* (-0.31) (-2.12)** (1.22) (0.17) (-1.66)
Tax Rate -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.07) (-0.44) (2.93)*** (-2.13)** (0.71) (3.33)***
Trade Agreements Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829
R-squared 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.09
Table 3
Host Country Financial Development and the Spatial Distribution of MNC Sales
(Affiliate-level evidence, 1989-2009)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as a full set of multilateral and regional trade
agreement dummies. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.078 0.018 0.013 -0.048 0.016 0.009
(-3.07)*** (1.48) (1.82)* (-3.26)*** (3.01)*** (2.32)**
Controls
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829
R-squared 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.06
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.084 0.038 0.055 -0.043 0.036 0.047
(-3.19)*** (1.22) (2.06)** (-2.72)*** (2.49)** (3.85)***
Controls
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829 211,829
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.13
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as all country-level controls from Table 2. T-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 5
Alternative Specification: Tobit Estimation
(Affiliate-level evidence, 1989-2009)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
Table 4
Alternative Measures of the Spatial Distribution of MNC Sales
(Affiliate-level evidence, 1989-2009)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as all country-level controls from Table 2. T-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
SalesTotal
UnaffLocal
SalesTotal
AffUS
SalesTotal
ctryrdUnaff 3
SalesTotal
UnaffLocal
SalesTotal
AffUS
SalesTotal
ctryrdUnaff 3
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.059 0.027 0.011 -0.033 0.017 0.010
(-2.76)*** (1.67)* (1.60) (-2.56)** (2.06)** (2.60)**
Controls
Parent Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 206,535 206,535 206,535 206,535 206,535 206,535
R-squared 0.19 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.20
Table 6
Alternative Specification: Parent Firm Fixed Effects
(Affiliate-level evidence, 1989-2009)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
Notes: All regressions include year and parent firm fixed effects, as well as all country-level controls from Table
2. Sample restricted to firms with affiliates in at least two countries. T-statistics based on robust standard errors
clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.059 0.030 0.011 -0.034 0.020 0.009
(-2.30)** (1.53) (1.14) (-2.22)** (1.95)* (2.00)**
Financial Devt x -0.010 0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.001
Ext Fin Depend (-3.51)*** (2.34)** (1.84)* (-2.63)** (2.23)** (0.94)
Controls
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 159,185 159,185 159,185 159,185 159,185 159,185
R-squared 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.10
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.016 -0.021 0.001 -0.015 -0.012 0.000
(-0.67) (-1.77)* (0.21) (-0.84) (-2.54)** (0.01)
Financial Devt x -0.007 0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.001
Ext Fin Depend (-3.09)*** (1.91)* (1.62) (-2.49)** (1.96)* (0.81)
Controls
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 159,164 159,164 159,164 159,164 159,164 159,164
R-squared 0.16 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.12
Cross-Sectoral Variation in External Finance Dependence: Country Fixed Effects
(Affiliate-level evidence, 1989-2009)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as all country-level controls from Table 2. T-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as all country-level controls from Table 2. T-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 8
Table 7
Cross-Sectoral Variation in External Finance Dependence
(Affiliate-level evidence, 1989-2009)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable: Log # Firms in Host Ctry
Log # Firms 
in Host Ctry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Financial Devt 0.792 0.236
(6.82)*** (3.56)***
Fitted Log # Firms -0.117 0.074 0.015 -0.124 0.080 0.016
in Host Ctry (-2.74)*** (2.76)*** (0.89) (-1.26) (1.43) (0.56)
Controls
Industry FE -- Y Y Y -- Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 584 145,456 145,456 145,456 585 145,456 145,456 145,456
R-squared 0.71 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.69 0.09 0.16 0.08
Table 9
Uncovering the Mechanism: Number of Host Country Establishments
(Affiliate-level evidence, 1989-2009)
Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and all other controls in Table 2. T-statistics based on robust standard
errors clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Stock Market Cap / GDPPrivate Credit / GDP
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
Local
SalesTotal
US
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
SalesTotal
ctryrd 3
Country Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Country Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Country Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
Algeria 0.15 0.16 Guatemala 0.21 0.08 0.01 0.00 Paraguay 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.01
Argentina 0.16 0.05 0.30 0.31 Guyana 0.43 0.08 0.20 0.03 Peru 0.17 0.08 0.35 0.39
Australia 0.82 0.23 0.93 0.40 Haiti 0.13 0.02 Philippines 0.29 0.10 0.51 0.23
Austria 0.99 0.10 0.24 0.20 Honduras 0.35 0.10 0.08 Poland 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.18
Bahrain 0.41 0.07 0.92 0.10 Hong Kong 1.43 0.14 3.10 1.62 Portugal 1.05 0.45 0.34 0.20
Bangladesh 0.28 0.06 0.04 0.04 Hungary 0.38 0.14 0.21 0.12 Qatar 0.29 0.04 0.78 0.64
Belgium 0.71 0.18 0.59 0.23 Iceland 0.88 0.76 1.36 0.72 Russia 0.19 0.12 0.42 0.46
Bolivia 0.41 0.13 0.13 0.07 India 0.30 0.09 0.55 0.63 Saudi Arabia 0.26 0.07 0.60 0.39
Botswana 0.14 0.04 0.24 0.21 Indonesia 0.33 0.13 0.25 0.17 Senegal 0.20 0.04
Brazil 0.35 0.08 0.40 0.39 Iran 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.07 Singapore 0.92 0.12 1.61 0.45
Bulgaria 0.34 0.22 0.22 0.34 Ireland 1.01 0.59 0.60 0.10 Slovakia 0.41 0.07 0.07 0.01
Cameroon 0.12 0.07 Israel 0.71 0.14 0.63 0.48 Slovenia 0.44 0.22 0.29 0.34
Canada 0.96 0.24 0.94 0.44 Italy 0.71 0.18 0.35 0.18 South Africa 0.63 0.10 1.76 0.66
Chile 0.55 0.12 0.89 0.28 Jamaica 0.22 0.05 0.61 0.42 Spain 1.05 0.42 0.63 0.38
Colombia 0.30 0.07 0.21 0.17 Japan 1.49 0.41 0.84 0.23 Sri Lanka 0.23 0.08 0.15 0.06
Congo 0.06 0.05 Jordan 0.71 0.12 1.06 0.67 Sudan 0.04 0.02
Costa Rica 0.22 0.12 0.10 0.04 Kenya 0.22 0.02 0.20 0.14 Sweden 0.69 0.35 0.93 0.38
Cote D'Ivoire 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.22 Kuwait 0.47 0.19 0.75 0.28 Switzerland 1.61 0.07 1.98 0.93
Croatia 0.61 0.13 0.42 0.31 Lebanon 0.24 0.23 Syria 0.09 0.01
Cyprus 1.42 0.36 0.40 0.24 Luxembourg 1.24 0.47 1.89 1.49 Tanzania 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02
Czech Republic 0.49 0.14 0.27 0.11 Malawi 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.04 Thailand 1.03 0.28 0.54 0.22
Denmark 0.97 0.70 0.52 0.22 Malaysia 1.09 0.22 1.64 0.54 Trinidad & Tobago 0.30 0.03 0.49 0.34
Dominican Rep 0.21 0.05 Malta 0.97 0.15 0.34 0.20 Tunisia 0.54 0.04 0.12 0.05
Ecuador 0.23 0.06 0.08 0.03 Mexico 0.19 0.06 0.30 0.13 Turkey 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.12
Egypt 0.38 0.12 0.36 0.34 Morocco 0.43 0.17 0.39 0.44 Uganda 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00
El Salvador 0.35 0.09 0.19 0.12 Netherlands 1.24 0.43 0.97 0.39 United Kingdom 1.31 0.30 1.30 0.29
Finland 0.69 0.14 0.94 0.71 New Zealand 1.05 0.25 0.39 0.09 Uruguay 0.32 0.15 0.01 0.00
France 0.91 0.09 0.65 0.33 Norway 0.64 0.09 0.44 0.28 Venezuela 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.05
Gabon 0.11 0.04 Oman 0.34 0.04 0.23 0.11 Vietnam 0.51 0.28 0.07 0.09
Germany 1.05 0.10 0.41 0.19 Pakistan 0.24 0.02 0.20 0.13 Yemen 0.06 0.01
Ghana 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.07 Panama 0.69 0.18 0.22 0.09 Zambia 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.08
Greece 0.50 0.24 0.41 0.32 Papua New Guinea 0.18 0.05 0.64 0.15
Panel Variation: 0.51 0.44 0.56 0.68
Private Credit Stock Mkt Cap
Notes: Private credit and stock market capitalization are both normalized by GDP.
Appendix Table 1
Summary Statistics: Host Country Financial Development
Private Credit Stock Mkt Cap Private Credit Stock Mkt Cap
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.083 0.037 0.021 -0.049 0.028 0.012
(-3.32)*** (1.67)* (3.29)*** (-2.87)*** (2.17)** (2.50)**
Financial Devt x -0.019 0.010 0.002 -0.012 0.007 0.001
Ext Fin Depend (-4.18)*** (3.21)*** (1.30) (-6.86)*** (3.40)*** (1.82)*
Controls
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149
R-squared 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.15
Fin Devt Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Devt -0.056 -0.016 -0.001 -0.030 -0.011 0.008
(-2.01)** (-1.44) (-0.19) (-1.20) (-1.98)* (2.00)**
Financial Devt x -0.017 0.010 0.001 -0.011 0.007 0.001
Ext Fin Depend (-3.84)*** (3.14)*** (0.93) (-6.49)*** (3.32)*** (1.65)
Controls
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# observations 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149
R-squared 0.27 0.30 0.18 0.27 0.30 0.18
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as all country-level controls from Table 2.
T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Notes: All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, as well as all country-level controls from Table 2.
T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by host country reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Appendix Table 3
Cross-Sectoral Variation in External Finance Dependence: Country Fixed Effects
(Aggregate evidence, benchmark years only)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
Appendix Table 2
Cross-Sectoral Variation in External Finance Dependence
(Aggregate evidence, benchmark years only)
Private Credit / GDP Stock Market Cap / GDP
GDP, GDP per capita, Distance, K/L, H/L, Rule of Law, Tax Rate, Trade Agreement Dummies
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Productivity Cutoffs and Industry Structure 
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Figure 2a 
Modes of Operation (illustrated for Western firms) 
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Modes of Operation (illustrated for Western firms) 
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Figure 3 
Response of Productivity Cutoffs and Industry Structure to  
an Improvement in Southern Financial Development 
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Figure 4
An Example: MNC Sales Shares in Host Countries with Different Levels of Financial Development
Brazil, 1999
Fin Devt: 0.29
Chile, 1994
Fin Devt: 0.43
Norway, 1989
Fin Devt: 0.61
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